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Article 3

Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright,
Consecration, and Control
John Tehranian*
“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”
—George Orwell, Animal Farm

I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual-property jurisprudence increasingly informs the way
in which social order is maintained in the twenty-first century. By
regulating cultural production and patrolling the dissemination of
knowledge, copyright law mediates the exercise of important social,
political, and economic rights, thereby playing a critical role in the
construction of our information society. In theory, ostensibly neutral
ground rules guide the vesting, enforcement, and adjudication of
rights pertaining to creative works in a way that best advances the
constitutionally mandated purpose of the copyright regime: progress
in the arts. 1 But, in reality, copyright law’s procedural and
substantive doctrines do more than just advance “progress in the
arts” and can serve as powerful tools for the regulation, control, and
manipulation of meaning. This Article identifies and builds on an
emerging literature 2—one that it refers to as “critical intellectualproperty” scholarship—to introduce a framework for studying just
how copyright transcends its small corner of the legal universe by
shaping social structures and regulating individual behavior as part of
a larger hegemonic project.
As John Fiske writes, “Popular culture always is part of power
relations; it always bears traces of constant struggle between
domination and subordination, between power and various forms of
resistance to it or evasions of it . . . .” 3 Thus, it is not surprising that
∗ AB, Harvard University, JD, Yale Law School. Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law,
Southwestern Law School. Portions of this Article are based on sections of my book,
Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You (Oxford University Press, 2011). I would like to
thank Rose Sélavy and R. Mutt for inspiring the themes in this Article and Joseph Ballstaedt,
Sarah Swanson, and Michael Worth for their invaluable research and editorial assistance.
1. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE 19 (Routledge 2d ed. 2010)
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intellectual-property laws that control access to and use of popular
culture are a function of power relations. In the early 1970s,
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concept of cultural
reproduction to explain the processes through which the dominant
class retained its power. 4 Drawing on the example of schooling in
modern society, he argued that educational institutions function
largely to preserve hegemonic interests by perpetuating the
reproduction of the cultural and social values of the dominant class. 5
Bourdieu’s work on cultural reproduction has inspired waves of
scholarship in the social sciences, 6 but it has not generated as much
interest in the field of intellectual property. Yet the notion of cultural
reproduction is instrumental to understanding the consequences of
intellectual-property laws on knowledge–power systems. Bourdieu’s
work and the scholarship it has inspired suggest that the inviolate
recitation of the cultural production of dominant social forces is a
profound vehicle for the inculcation of a set of values and symbols
that consolidate existing power structures. 7 If that is the case, the act
of imperfect reproduction, or of customization, of cultural
production can translate into an act of subversion or reproduction of
the existing social order in a particular form. These acts of
differentiation and similitude, or the acts of imperfect reproduction
and customization, are carefully regulated by intellectual-property
laws. 8 And the selective protection granted to cultural production
under the guise of copyright reveals the role of intellectual-property
law in molding identities, enforcing dominant values, and controlling
expressive rights. In short, user and creator rights are determined by
intellectual-property laws that can help both maintain and perpetuate
existing social structures. 9 Copyright’s procedural and substantive
(1989).
4. PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION,
SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (Richard Nice trans., 2d ed. 1990) (1970).
5. Id. at 56 (referring to a diploma as a “juridically sanctioned validation of the results
of inculcation”).
6. See, e.g., JEN WEBB ET AL., UNDERSTANDING BOURDIEU (2002) (presenting a
primer on Bourdieu targeting students of sociology and cultural studies).
7. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE
JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1984) (analyzing the social meaning imbued in
even the most trivial exertions of taste and the role of taste in the construction of identity and
class differentiation); BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 4, at 56 (analyzing the role of the
formal educational system in inculcating values and symbols that perpetuate class differences).
8. See, for example, the expansive derivative-rights doctrine described infra, note 76
and accompanying text.
9. This is not to suggest that intellectual-property laws inevitably maintain and
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rules therefore serve as a key vehicle for the discursive exertion of
knowledge–power systems on individuals.
Part II of this Article examines the link between intellectualproperty rights and knowledge–power systems. Specifically, it frames
the theoretical underpinnings of this study of copyright law in
cultural studies. A growing body of scholarship has begun to analyze
the relationship between trademark, copyright, and patent doctrines
and wider power struggles by assessing the myriad ways in which our
intellectual-property regime reflects and even accentuates traditional
race-, gender-, orientation-, and class-based divides. Although this
literature has not received a collective appellation, it has made a vital
contribution to understanding the broader implications of
intellectual-property law from a perspective informed, at least
implicitly, by critical theory. This Article therefore identifies this
nascent scholarship as developing a ‘critical intellectual-property’
theory. This Article then situates this critical intellectual-property
scholarship in relation to the extant literature in the more mature
movements of critical legal studies and critical race theory.
Building on this critical intellectual-property scholarship, this
Article turns its attention towards constructing a theoretical model
for assessing the broader impact of intellectual-property protections
on hegemonic practices. It does so both to elucidate the
relationships among present contributions in the field and to provide
a framework for future work. Specifically, this Article recognizes
three primary moments of analytical interest for critical intellectualproperty queries: (1) the vesting of rights, (2) the assertion of rights,
and (3) the adjudication of rights. Decision-making in these three
theaters of operation reveals the intricate way in which ostensibly
neutral laws have combined to create hierarchies of informational
and cultural rights that patrol relations between sovereigns and their
subjects, corporations and individuals, and entrenched interests and
surging parvenus.
Thus, Part III focuses on the genesis of rights and the way in
which the vesting of copyright protection beatifies certain forms of
cultural production. To illustrate this point and to provide a
historical analysis of intellectual-property law as a hegemonic
battleground, the Article examines the origins of the derivative-rights
doctrine as a response to tensions over access to cultural content.
perpetuate existing social structures. They can also facilitate resistance and counter-hegemonic
practices.
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Specifically, the example of William Shakespeare and the opera—
surprisingly populist works in the nineteenth century that
transformed into the fodder of only the elite in the twentieth
century—helps trace the development of cultural hierarchy and chart
the interplay between norms and the law in the process of sacralizing
creative content. Part III concludes by examining the works of The
Beatles, as embodied in both the musical Love and Danger Mouse’s
The Grey Album, to demonstrate how modern copyright law patrols
acts of cultural reproduction and semiotic disobedience.
Part IV turns its attention to the assertion of rights. Specifically,
it examines the power dynamics at play in determining how and
when rights are enforced and the resulting impact that selective
enforcement has on the semiotic influence of cultural content. To
illustrate this point, the Article considers the unauthorized use of
sound recordings by the federal government at American detention
facilities at Guantanamo Bay and the conspicuous silence about the
practice by the music industry. Part IV contrasts this state of affairs
to the aggressive, high-profile enforcement tactics that the music
industry has used to fight the scourge of individual file sharing on
the Internet. In the process, we witness how copyright, and its
selective enforcement, can mediate the relationship between
sovereigns and their subjects.
Finally, Part V focuses on how copyright interests are vindicated
in the adjudicative process. Specifically, it charts how both the
procedural and substantive aspects of copyright doctrine create
hierarchies of protection and impact broader social, economic, and
political rights. With respect to procedure, copyright’s seemingly
innocuous registration rules create a vast disparity in the effective
protections from infringement enjoyed by sophisticated versus nonsophisticated creators. Thus, procedural niceties reflect and
perpetuate a broader societal project establishing cultural hierarchy
and the consecration of sacred texts. With respect to substantive
adjudication, Part V builds on a body of literature that has
highlighted the impact that aesthetic judgments have in courts’
weighing of copyright claims. Specifically, aesthetic judgments reflect
subtle, value-laden determinations about the place of creative
content in our cultural hierarchy. To illustrate this point, an exegesis
of two recent cases involving unauthorized send-ups of classic
American novels—Gone with the Wind and The Catcher in the Rye—
demonstrates how courts can abandon a rhetorical commitment to
aesthetic neutrality in conducting their fair-use analyses and how
1236
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implicit, but powerful, judgments about a work’s worth—in a
sociopolitical context—can influence the outcomes of suits. To
paraphrase George Orwell, while the law may tell us that all
copyrighted works are created equal, it turns out that some are more
equal than others.
II. ANALYZING IP AND POWER
A. IP as Hegemonic Battleground
Intellectual property has, for many years, served as a key
battleground for the struggle between entrenched economic interests
and emerging competitors. An examination of historical conflicts
between intellectual-property maximalists and minimalists illustrates
this point. As Lawrence Lessig has argued, many of the same
industries that now lobby heavily for strong intellectual-property
rights established themselves precisely because of their flagrant,
unauthorized exploitation of the intellectual property of others. 10
Thus, the very entrenched powers now advocating copyright
maximalism benefitted from brazen infringement during their
formative years. 11
For more than a century, the fledgling American publishing
industry reaped handsome economic rewards from the ability to
reproduce the works of foreign authors—especially those from
Britain—without paying a penny in royalties. 12 Cable television
blossomed because of retransmission of the signals (i.e., the
copyrighted content) of the major networks without authorization
or payment. 13 Hollywood became the center of motion-picture
10. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY
53–64 (2006).
11. See infra notes 12–18.
12. By and large, works by foreign authors did not enjoy copyright protection in the
United States from 1790 through 1891. See Seth M. Goldstein, Hitchcock’s “Rear Window”
and International Copyright Law: An Examination of Stewart v. Abend & Its Effect on
International Copyright Renewal and Exploitation, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247,
258 (2006).
13. Niels B. Schaumann, Note, Copyright Protection in the Cable Television Industry:
Satellite Retransmission and the Passive Carrier Exemption, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 637–40
(1983). Without this exception, cable television would have had a much harder time gaining
its foothold in the American living room. Imagine how cable would have fared without
unauthorized retransmission of network signals: Cable companies could have offered
consumers a panoply of untested alternatives—a crazy 24/7 news channel, a wacky station that
played only music videos all day long, a network devoted to b-movies—but it would have
come without regular networks. And, of course, the cable stations would have been hard
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universe when Louis Mayer famously travelled to the West Coast to
seek better weather and to reduce production costs. 14 But, less
famously, Mayer and his cronies were seeking to evade the watchful
eye of Thomas Edison and his attorneys. 15 Edison, it turned out,
owned numerous patents for technology used by the burgeoning
film industry, and filmmakers were eager to reduce their production
costs by not having to license these patent rights. 16 In short,
Hollywood was born of infringement. Major studios such as Walt
Disney have long profited by drawing upon the rich intellectual
tradition of folk tales without compensating anyone for their
exploitation. 17 And the modern music industry saw much of its early
success from the unauthorized exploitation of old blues riffs, many
stolen directly from unacknowledged African American–folk artists. 18
We continue to see this clash between prior creators and
emerging innovators in action today. For example, leading Internet
sites are pushing the line on copyright law as they challenge the

pressed to obtain licenses for retransmission from the major networks as they had no interest in
fueling their own demise by making the transition to cable all the more palatable. The
networks wanted cable to come at a cost: you either got the networks or you got the cable
stations. However, when cable provides the cable stations plus crystal-clear feeds of network
channels, the temptation of subscribing to cable becomes all the greater, if not irresistible.
14. SCOTT EYMAN, LION OF HOLLYWOOD: THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF LOUIS B.
MAYER 53 (2005).
15. Peter Edidin, La-La Land: The Origins, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at C2 (noting
that “Los Angeles’s distance from New York was also comforting to independent film
producers, making it easier for them to avoid being harassed or sued by the Motion Picture
Patents Company, aka the Trust, which Thomas Edison helped create in 1909”).
16. In 1908, Edison and nine other patentees formed the Motion Picture Patents
Company to pool their intellectual-property rights and effectively control nearly all
motion-picture technology. The MPCC rigorously enforced its patent rights against
independent movie producers, bringing infringement claims against any producer not using
properly licensed equipment. Alexandra Gil, Breaking The Studios: Antitrust and the Motion
Picture Industry, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 83, 91–92 (2008).
17. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 23–24 (“The catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937), Fantasia (1940),
Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of the South (1946), Cinderella
(1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the
Tramp (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961), The Sword in
the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967).”).
18. See, e.g., Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—
LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1598–99 (1997) (“In the
1950’s, many white artists became superstars either by re-recording black music for white
audiences, like Pat Boone, or by drawing more indirectly on African-American musical
traditions, like Elvis Presley. Indeed, the phenomenon called ‘rock ‘n’ roll,’ now associated
primarily with white artists and white audiences, emerged from the African-American blues
tradition.”).
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dominion of entrenched powers. Consider the ongoing showdown
between Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Web 2.0 outfits such as
YouTube, Wikipedia, WordPress and Blogger have thrived on the
exploitation of “user-generated content”—much of which consists of
either the copyrighted works of third parties or works by users that,
without authorization, make use of the copyrighted works of third
parties. 19 These third parties are frequently the major movies studios
and record labels. To date, Web 2.0 companies have shielded
themselves from liability through the precarious provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) safe harbor provision
for Internet service providers who host user-generated content; 20 but
those provisions are under attack by traditional-media conglomerates
such as Viacom, who claim that YouTube illegitimately free rides on
the backs of content creators whose works provide the value that
makes YouTube a top online destination. 21 The battle has also spilled
outside of the judiciary and legislature and into the court of public
opinion. In early 2012, as congressional support for the controversial
Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) grew, Web 2.0 outfits successfully
protested the legislation by either shutting down for a day (in the
case of Wikipedia) or drawing attention to the arguments against

SOPA on their front page (in the case of Google). 22 SOPA was
soon dead.
The resolution of these intellectual-property struggles does not
simply impact the distribution of private wealth between companies.
Just as significantly, it also determines the future control of

19. ROBERT P. LATHAM, JEREMY T. BROWN & CARL C. BUTZER, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
USER GENERATED CONTENT: YOUTUBE, MYSPACE, FACEBOOK (2012), available at
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/ 892.pdf
20. The DMCA immunizes qualifying Internet services providers from monetary liability
on claims of contributory infringement when, at the direction of a user, they store material that
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by them so long as, inter alia, they do
not have actual knowledge of the infringement, are unaware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent, and act expeditiously to disable access or remove once
receiving such knowledge or awareness. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
21. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), vacated, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
22. See Declan McCullagh, Wikipedia, Google Blackout Sites to Protest SOPA, CNET
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57360754281/wikipedia-google-blackout-sites-to-protest-sopa.
OF
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informational and cultural content. In this way, the contours of
intellectual-property law shape social structures, and jolts to the
regime can produce fissures along significant fault lines such as race,
class, gender, and sexual orientation.
B. Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Critical IP Theory
In assessing the broader impact of intellectual-property law on
social structures and issues of race, class, gender, and sexual
orientation, we draw inspiration from a body of literature in critical
legal studies and critical race theory. Building on the work of such
social theorists as Antonio Gramsci, 23 Max Weber, 24 and Michel
Foucault, 25 the critical-legal-studies movement has explored the link
between power relationships in society and the development of legal
doctrine and the structure of legal practice. 26 In particular, critical
23. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI 12, 161, 170, 416–17 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971).
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, grounded in both the consent of the masses and the coercive
apparatus of the state, has been used by critical legal studies scholars to analyze legal rights and
legal reasoning. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F.
32, 32 (1982); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1351–52 (“Law . . . embodies and reinforces ideological assumptions about human relations
that people accept as natural or even immutable.”); Robert Gordon, New Developments in
Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286 (David Kairys
ed., 1982) (“[T]he most effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and
dominated classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is
satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect, because things pretty
much have to be the way they are.” (citing GRAMSCI, supra, at 195–96, 246–47)).
24. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western
Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2004) (positing the strong affiliation between
Weber’s sociology of law and the tenets of the critical legal studies movement); Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1
(1983) (noting the particular influence of the social and historical analyses of Marx and Weber
on many critical legal theorists).
25. Foucault’s deconstruction of social discourses, legal or otherwise, in light of
discursive power relationships has been tremendously influential on critical legal scholarship.
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING, ETC.
83 (1993); William P. Alford, On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 945, 946 (1986) (“The work of Habermas and Foucault, for example, has attracted a
following among American legal scholars, particularly in and around the critical legal studies
movement”).
26. See, e.g., CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed., 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick &
Alan Hunt eds., 1987); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: ARTICLES, NOTES, AND BOOK REVIEWS
SELECTED FROM THE PAGES OF THE HARVARD REVIEW (1986); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
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legal theory has questioned claims over the naturalness, objectivity,
and neutrality of certain legal discourses, including formalism,
essentialism, and law and economics. 27 In so doing, critical legal
theorists have deconstructed “the role that the myth of ‘neutral law’
plays in legitimating legal discourse” and have examined “the way
that the legal system translates a politically loaded social reality into a
world of depoliticized operational signs or ideological chimeras.” 28
Critical race theory, which began as a subset of, 29 and even
reaction to, 30 the critical legal studies movement, has focused on the
particular role that law and its institutions have played in both
maintaining and perpetuating racial subordination. 31 In particular,
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 674
(1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
27. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 689–90 (1985).
28. Id. at 706.
29. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 741, 743 (1994) (“CRT [Critical Race Theory] is the heir to both CLS [Critical Legal
Studies] and traditional civil rights scholarship.”).
30. Among other things, critical race theorists have critiqued the traditional critical legal
studies movement for not doing enough to focus on systemic issues of race discrimination and
non-intentional, but nevertheless significant, forms of racial subordination not easily remedied
by legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical
Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899–901 (1995).
31. See, e.g., STEVEN BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE
AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2003); ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS,
LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE (1999); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS (Dorothy A. Brown ed., 2003); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller
& Kendall Thomas eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001); RACE
AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan Perea, Richard Delgado,
Angela Harris & Stephanie Wildman eds., 2000); JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED:
AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY (2009); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998); FRANK H. WU, YELLOW:
RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002); Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of
Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996); Robert S. Chang,
Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and
Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241 (1993); Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind
Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writings About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003);
Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215 (2002);
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); Tanya Kateri
Hernandez, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind
Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike:
Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261
(1997).
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critical race theorists have explored the ways in which the trope of
colorblindness and ostensibly neutral ordering rules have “not only
allowed law to ignore the social and institutional structures of
oppression created historically and recreated presently in law and
practice” but also have “blunted efforts to dismantle the racial caste
system.” 32 Take the debate over the regulation of hate speech, for
example. Channeling the provocative arguments of Charles
Lawrence and Mari Matsude, Derrick Bell has noted that
being committed to “free speech” may seem like a neutral
principle, but it is not. Thus, proclaiming that “I am committed
equally to allowing free speech for the KKK and 2LiveCrew” is a
non-neutral value judgment, one that asserts that the freedom to
say hateful things is more important than the freedom to be free
from the victimization, stigma, and humiliation that hate speech
entails. 33

Critical race theorists have therefore identified and critiqued
systemic features of our legal system that may contribute to the
disenfranchisement of communities of color. 34
In recent years, a new body of intellectual-property literature has
emerged, imbued with the spirit of critical legal studies and critical
race theory. Scholars have begun to explore the relationship between
gender and intellectual property, 35 examining such issues as the
gendered aspects of copyright’s fair-use doctrine, 36 the tension

32. Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race
Theory, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006).
33. Bell, supra note 30, at 902 (citing Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320
(1989)).
34. Id. at 900.
35. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185 (2006) (highlighting the role that feminist theory can play
in revealing how “the dualism of mind and body that pervades both patent and copyright law”
can “determine[] and maintain[] a pervasive set of power relationships in society”); Madhavi
Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 69, 70 (2000).
36. Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 552, 559–64 (2006) (“Many of the professionally
prominent, active legal scholars in the intellectual-property subject areas, those whose
publications obtain high numbers of citations and receive the most numerous and prestigious
speaking engagements (citations and conference invitations being important metrics for
gauging reputation and prestige), do not explicitly address issues of gender, race, or economic
class in their scholarship very frequently”).
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between feminism and the expansive scope of copyrightable and
patentable subject matter, 37 and the role of copyright law in
dissuading “non-hierarchical, associative webs” critical to feminist
discourse. 38 Similarly, scholars have examined the complex interface
between intellectual-property laws and race in assessing, for example,
the role of copyright rules in legitimating the unacknowledged and
uncompensated usurpation of traditional African American–folk and
blues in the development of the modern music industry. 39 More
broadly, research within the field has addressed the relationship
between intellectual property and sexual orientation 40 and the impact
of intellectual-property regimes on global inequalities. 41
While this particular body of intellectual-property research has
not acquired a collective appellation, it shares a common
methodology and inquisitive approach. For lack of a better term and
in recognition of its philosophical roots, I refer to this body of work
37. Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the
Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 603, 605 (2006) (“This article’s core claim is that the public domain is
inherently feminist, especially for those who recognize that ‘both women and men are
oppressed by the “sex role system”’ of western capitalism. By enlarging and protecting the
public domain, society would move towards a more feminine, and therefore more humanist,
culture.” (quoting ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMENIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 8 (1983)).
38. Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 519, 519 (2006) (addressing the conflict between our existing copyright law and
feminist conceptions of hypertext).
39. See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 117–48 (2001) (tracing the
appropriation of blues by rock ‘n’ roll artists over time); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C.
Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547,
550–51 (2006); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over
African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1193 (2008) (“The
fleecing of Black artists was the basis of the success of the American music industry . . . .”); K.J.
Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 358–59 (1999); K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection
of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER. SOC. POL’Y & L. 365, 371–
74 (2008).
40. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the
Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 187, 223 (2005) (documenting and challenging how existing “neutral” trademark
rules have been utilized to deny intellectual-property protection to “queer marks”).
41. Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism,
Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, “Global” Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 461–64 (1998) (discussing how the seemingly neutral
harmonization of intellectual-property standards has profound North-South implications);
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1331, 1354 (2004) (cautioning that the trope of a “romantic public domain” can relegate
forms of traditional knowledge to the commons and thereby exacerbate global inequities).
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as “critical IP theory,” which I loosely define as the deconstruction
of trademark, copyright, and patent laws and norms in light of
existing power relationships to better understand the role of
intellectual property in both maintaining and perpetuating social
hierarchy and subordination. Drawing on this growing body of
critical IP literature, this Article assesses the role of copyright law in
creating hierarchies of work entitled to differing levels of protection
and the hegemonic consequences of these hierarchies on societal
knowledge–power systems.
Copyright law represents a key battleground in power relations,
especially in the twenty-first century, as various societal actors
struggle for the rights to control, regulate, or manipulate cultural
content. Old industries use intellectual-property enforcement to
resist competition from start-ups. 42 Sovereigns benefit from
intellectual-property exemptions (both de facto and de jure) that
enable their free use and reinterpretation of cultural content. 43 And
corporations rely on intellectual-property rights to attempt to
consecrate their cultural content. 44 However, not all cultural content
is treated the same way, and the particular structure of copyright law
in doling out differing levels of protection to creative works
represents a key aspect of broader domination and subordination
practices. Under our copyright regime, some works become
beautified as sacred texts while others remain subject to
unadulterated manipulation and reinterpretation. And as we shall
42. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the dynamics of the litigation
between traditional media conglomerate Viacom and Web 2.0 outfit YouTube).
43. See infra Part IV.A (noting the absence of copyright enforcement against the federal
government for its unauthorized public performance of musical compositions at the military
base at Guantanamo Bay and the resulting recoding of songs such as “Born in the U.S.A.”).
On the de jure side of the equation, consider the sovereign immunity granted to states on
claims of copyright infringement. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607–
08 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting, as unconstitutional, Congress’s Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act (“CRCA”), which sought to hold states liable for acts of copyright infringement); Romero
v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23193, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009)
(same); Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d
1088, 1094–95 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (same).
44. Mattel, for example, is notorious for its aggressive attempts to use intellectualproperty litigation to prevent unauthorized artistic reinterpretations of Barbie. See, e.g., Mattel,
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Mattel’s
claims of copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement against artist Thomas Forsythe for
his photographs portraying a sexualized, naked Barbie in absurd positions with vintage
household appliances); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906–07 (9th Cir.
2002) (rejecting Mattel’s claims that Aqua’s pop hit Barbie Girl—which lampooned the
famous doll—infringed and diluted the “Barbie” trademark).
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see, this process occurs in at least three primary moments of
analytical interest: (1) the vesting of rights, (2) the assertion of
rights, and (3) the adjudication of rights.
III. THE VESTING OF RIGHTS
A. Derivative-Rights Protection and the Emergence of Cultural
Distinction: Highbrow/Lowbrow Norms and the Remix of Art
The process of creating rights represents an instrumental part of
a wider historical project driving the protection of elite culture and
the regulation of social boundaries. To illustrate this process, we
contemplate the interaction of norms and law in the vesting of
derivative-rights protection to copyright owners. In the early years of
the Republic, copyright law simply forbade the literal reproduction
of protected works, in toto, without authorization. 45 The subject
matter of copyright was limited to books, charts, and maps. 46 And,
quite notably, transformative (derivative) uses of copyrighted works
were deemed to be, per se, non-infringing. 47 As a result, even the
unauthorized act of abridgement or translation of a copyrighted
work was considered permissible. 48 The limited nature of the
copyright monopoly enabled the types of activities that characterized
American cultural scene in the early- and mid-nineteenth century:
the frequent reinterpretation, remixing, transformation, parody,
embellishment, abridgement, adaptation, and alteration of a panoply
of works that now form the inviolable canon. 49 Over time, this

45. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright,
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 466 (2005) (“[E]arly copyright laws prohibited slavish copying of
a protected work . . . .”).
46. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
47. Tehranian, supra note 45, at 474–80.
48. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 652 (1834) (“An abridgement
fairly done, is itself authorship, requires mind; and is not an infringement, no more than
another work on the same subject.”); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1853) (No. 13,514) (“To make a good translation of a work, often requires more learning,
talent and judgment, than was required to write the original. Many can transfer from one
language to another, but few can translate. To call the translations of an author’s ideas and
conceptions into another language, a copy of his book, would be an abuse of terms, and
arbitrary judicial legislation.”); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847)
(No. 13,497) (“A fair abridgment of any book is considered a new work, as to write it requires
labor and exercise of judgment”).
49. See infra notes 51–68 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread remixing
and reinterpretation of Shakespeare, opera, and symphonic music in nineteenth century
America).
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changed with the introduction of the derivative-rights protection. 50
The establishment of this right as part of the firmament of modern
copyright law illuminates the copyright’s role in preserving elite
culture and regulating social boundaries.
We begin our analysis by focusing on the works of William
Shakespeare—a man whose works never enjoyed copyright
protection but whose oeuvre is firmly entrenched at the pinnacle of
our cultural hierarchy. And we start with a simple observation about
his poetry and prose: although it has long been part of the firmament
of a sacred Western canon, this was not always the case. As much as
it may surprise contemporary observers, the bard’s works enjoyed a
radically different cultural standing during the nineteenth century,
when his plays were widely disseminated and enjoyed by a wide
swath of American society. 51
In his book, Highbrow/Lowbrow, Lawrence Levine documents
the ubiquity of Shakespeare in the early popular culture of the
Republic and charts the evolving position of Shakespearean works in
American life over the course of the past century. 52 As it turns out,
during the nineteenth century, the bard’s works were the very
definition of popular, not elite, entertainment. 53 Shakespeare’s plays
were not only performed in venues throughout our country but his
characters and plotlines were frequently the subject of minstrel
parodies, abridgements, and re-interpretations, intermingled with
popular songs, farces, novelty acts, and dances. 54 In the absence of
any consecrating ethos, 55 his works were free to be manipulated and
altered so that they might appeal to audiences of all stripes, playing
in venues ranging from working-class burlesque and vaudeville shows
along the frontier to the Brahman’s East Coast theater. 56 Therefore,
Shakespeare played a central role in entertaining the American
masses. As a German observer from the era put it, one could always
50. Tehranian, supra note 45, at 489–91 (documenting the historical emergence of the
derivative-rights doctrine as an outcome of natural-law copyright sensibilities and noting its
role in controlling the remix and reinterpretation of creative works).
51. LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROW/LOWBROW: THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL
HIERARCHY IN AMERICA 16–17 (1988) (discussing how, during the nineteenth century,
Shakespeare was “presented and recognized almost everywhere in the country”).
52. See generally id.
53. Id. at 31.
54. Id. at 14–16.
55. Of course, it was not just norms that supported such uses of Shakespeare. An
absence of legal prohibitions also encouraged remixing activities.
56. See generally LEVINE, supra note 51, at 17–20.
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count on Shakespeare taking his rightful place alongside the Bible in
the American home:
There is, assuredly, no other country on earth in which Shakespeare
and the Bible are held in such general high esteem as in America,
the very country so much decried for its lust for money. If you were
to enter an isolated log cabin in the Far West and even if its
inhabitant were to exhibit many of the traces of backwoods living,
he will most likely have one small room nicely furnished in which
to spend his few leisure hours and in which you will certainly find
the Bible and in most cases also some cheap edition of the works of
the poet Shakespeare. 57

Near the fin de siècle, however, views changed dramatically, and
the works of Shakespeare increasingly came under the exclusive
dominion of the elite and formally educated. 58 Although a number
of demographic, gustatory, linguistic, and social trends partly explain
this transformation, 59 Levine identifies another key driving force: the
emergence of two distinct and mutually exclusive categories of
cultural content—highbrow and lowbrow. 60 The bifurcation
between these two types of works was policed through a sacralization
process that separated the populist from the patriciate. Specifically, a
beatifying ethos emerged, permeating works at the top of the
hierarchy with an air of untouchability. 61 Works were consecrated
into a single “authentic” form, which could not be modified or
reinterpreted. 62 Notes Levine, “By the turn of the century
Shakespeare has been converted from a popular playwright whose
dramas were the property of those who flocked to see them, into a
sacred author who had to be protected from ignorant audiences and
overbearing actors threatening the integrity of his creations.” 63 For
example, unlike the days of yore when transformations,
abridgements, and adaptations were encouraged, “actors were
admonished not to take liberties with the text of a Shakespearean
play.” 64 The malleable, populist Shakespeare gave way to an
embalmed, sacred version characterized by inviolability.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 49.
See generally id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 138.
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The transformation in Shakespeare during the era was not
unique. Similar changes occurred in opera, symphonic music, and
the fine arts as they joined the ranks of elite culture. 65 As Katherine
Preston’s research on nineteenth-century opera reveals, troupes
performed extensively in both English and Italian to large audiences
throughout antebellum America. 66 Explains Levine, “Opera in
America, like Shakespeare in America, was not presented as a sacred
text; it was performed by artists who felt free to embellish and alter,
add and subtract.” 67 However, opera’s sacralization placed the genre
in the exclusive province of the elite. 68 An unrepentant attack against
adulteration of canonized works is, of course, a key hallmark of the
consecration process. The remixing of Shakespeare, opera, and
symphonic music—accepted practice in the nineteenth century—had
become verboten.
B. Sacralization in the Late Nineteenth Century: Towards a
Derivative-Rights Doctrine
There is no mention of copyright law in Levine’s seminal study,
and, in this respect, Levine is not alone. Broadly speaking, and
probably due to the phenomenon of academic Balkanization, the
question of intellectual-property rights is widely underappreciated in
the literature of cultural studies. However, copyright protection lies
at the heart of the discursive struggle to police cultural hierarchy, to
beatify sacred texts, and to proscribe their unwanted embellishment,
abridgement, transformation, manipulation, and alteration. For
example, and not coincidentally, at the very moment when Levine
documents the emergence of a cultural rift between highbrow and
lowbrow content, copyright protections expanded in an especially
salient manner. Specifically, copyright holders began to enjoy a
power previously denied them: the exclusive right to prepare

65. For example, as symphonic music made the transition from mainstream to
highbrow, “the masterworks of the classic composers were to be performed in their entirety by
highly trained musicians on programs free from the contamination of lesser works or lesser
genres, free from the interference of audience or performer, free from the distractions of the
mundane; audiences were to approach the masters and their works with proper respect and
proper seriousness, for aesthetic and spiritual elevation rather than mere entertainment.” Id. at
146.
66. KATHERINE K. PRESTON, OPERA ON THE ROAD: TRAVELLING OPERA TROUPES IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1825–60, at 59, 116, 141 (1993); see also LEVINE, supra note 51, at 88.
67. LEVINE, supra note 51, at 89–90.
68. Id. at 101.
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derivative versions of their copyrighted works.
Under the 1831 Copyright Act (as with the 1790 Copyright Act
and the Statute of Anne before it), a copyright holder only possessed
“the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and
vending” a work. 69 In short, there was no derivative-rights
protection extended to copyright holders. As a result, the sacred
text—outside of religion, where norms demanded it—did not exist
as we know it. Celebrated works remained dynamic, ever-changing,
and responsive to the particular needs of diverse audiences. In the
nineteenth century, the elite cultural pursuits of modern times—such
as Shakespeare, opera, fine art, and symphonic music—were equally
as popular with the proletariat and the patriciate. 70
As Levine documents, the emerging fetishization of sacred texts
in the late nineteenth century played an instrumental role in the
creation and crystallization of cultural hierarchy. 71 Simultaneously,
copyright doctrine transformed, thereby both reflecting and reifying
these changing cultural attitudes and giving legal bite to the
hallowing process. When norms depressed efforts to bastardize the
“authentic” language, plots, characters, and themes of Shakespeare’s
works, copyright provided juridical force to the protection of works
from rampant popular manipulation and reinterpretation. 72 In 1870,
Congress overturned existing case law and amended the Copyright
Act of 1831 to secure for copyright holders the exclusive rights to
translate and dramatize their works. 73 The 1909 Copyright Act went
even further, granting such derivative rights as novelization and
musicalization exclusively to copyright holders. 74 Finally, the 1976

69. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
70. LEVINE, supra note 51, at 4, 21, 34, 85 & 100.
71. Id. at 72–74 (“The human Shakespeare who existed for most of the nineteenth
century could be parodied with pleasure and impunity; the sacred Shakespeare who displaced
him at its close posed greater problems.”); id. at 104 (“[T]he operate house [became] less a
center of entertainment than a sacred source of cultural enlightenment.”).
72. Of course, with Shakespeare in the public domain, anyone can make use of his works
and bastardize the language, plots, characters, and themes in any way one wants. But norms
depressed such activity, thereby leading to Shakespeare’s eventual transition from the peoples’
playwright to a leading symbol of highbrow culture. Copyright law achieves the same function
as those prior norms by interdicting the mongrelization of protected works.
73. Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (“[A]uthors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own
works”).
74. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). The Act gave authors the exclusive right to “translate the
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Copyright Act explicitly gave authors the exclusive right to prepare
all derivatives of their copyrighted works 75 and provided an expansive
definition of what constituted a derivative work. 76 Though motivated
by a variety of factors, including changing social norms, rather than a
singular congressional commitment to sacralization, the emergence
of the modern derivative-rights doctrine in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries secured the Benjamanian “aura” 77 of works.
With the sacralization process in full force, it is not surprising
that this era witnessed the counteractive rise of several subversive art
movements. Cultural hierarchy spawned its discontents in the form
of fine art movements such as Dadaism, futurism, fauvism, and
surrealism, 78 with the various art schools launching a broadside
attack against the very notion of sacred texts, undermining existing
perceptions of high art with ready-mades, collage, photomontage,
assemblage, and automatic drawing. 79 For example, Marcel
Duchamp’s infamous L.H.O.O.Q. seemingly performed the ultimate
sacrilege by mutilating Leonardo da Vinci’s hallowed Mona Lisa with

copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a
literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other
nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete,
execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art.” See id. § 1(b).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
76. Under the current 1976 Copyright Act, a derivative work is
a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.”
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
77. See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproductions, in
ILLUMINATIONS 224 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (arguing that, in an age
of mechanical reproduction, the ease of replicating creative works threatens art’s aura—its
perceived authenticity and ritualistic value); see also John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No
Copyright: Registration, Cultural Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright Militancy, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1399, 1401–02 (2009) (discussing the role of copyright law in
preserving and creating cultural hierarchy and, therefore, protecting the Benjaminian aura of
certain cultural production).
78. This is not to say that the movements themselves were not highly elitist in their own
way.
79. See, e.g., ANDRÉ BRETON, MANIFESTOS OF SURREALISM (1969); Tristan Tzara,
Dadaist Manifesto, in SEVEN DADA MANIFESTOS AND LAMPISTERIES (Barbara Wright trans.,
Calder Publications ed. 1977) (1919).
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a moustache, goatee, and a tawdry new title to boot. 80 Duchamp’s
own masterpiece, the ready-made Fountain, annihilated the
distinction between highbrow and lowbrow by bringing the urinal to
the museum. 81
Though the Dadaists and surrealists rarely discussed copyright
per se, their core ideas were imbued with their relationship to the
concept of intellectual property. Specifically, they rejected notions of
originality and authorial genius and challenged the rights of
exclusion that might go with such constructs. As the enigmatic and
self-styled Comte de Lautréamont, a leading influence on the
surrealists, argued, “Plagiarism is necessary. It is implied in the idea
of progress. It clasps the author’s sentence tight, uses his expressions,
eliminates a false idea, and replaces it with the right idea.” 82 On this
basis, Lautréamont freely “borrowed” from the works of Pascal,
Kant, La Fontaine, and others in making his own. 83 As Anna Nimus
observes, Lautréamont’s view “subverted the myth of individual
creativity, which was used to justify property relations in the name of
progress when it actually impeded progress by privatizing culture.
The natural response was to reappropriate culture as a sphere of
collective production without acknowledging artificial enclosures of
authorship.” 84 Thus, Lautréamont’s mantra “became a benchmark
for the 20th century avant-gardes. Dada rejected originality and
portrayed all artistic production as recycling and reassembling—from
Duchamp’s ready-mades, to Tzara’s rule for making poems from cutup newspapers, to the photomontages of Hoech, Hausmann and
Heartfield.” 85 In short, Dadaists, surrealists, and others members of
the avant-garde fervently challenged the sanctity of sacred texts,
freely creating unauthorized derivative works in defiance of the new
social norms and laws that gave such rights exclusively to copyright
holders.
During the intervening decades, the Dadaists and surrealists have

80. See Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q. (altered reproduction) (1919), available at
http://www.marcelduchamp.net/L.H.O.O.Q.php.
81. See Marcel Duchamp (as R. Mutt), Fountain (readymade) (1917), available at
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-t07573.
82. ISIDORE DUCASSE, POÉSIES 15 (1870), available at www.gutenberg.net.
83. JULIA KRISTEVA, THE SENSE AND NON-SENSE OF REVOLT: THE POWERS AND
LIMITS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 110-11 (Jeanine Herman trans., 2001).
84. Anna Nimus, Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anticommons, SUBSOL,
http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/nimustext.html (last visited July 26, 2012).
85. Id.
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been recaptured by the elite (if they were ever outside of the elite in
the first place). Their works feature prominently in museum
exhibitions worldwide and enjoy renown among the cognoscenti.
But they were not co-opted. Their revolutionary influence continues
to be felt, as they have forced a pronounced change in elite culture:
their attack on the highbrow/lowbrow distinction has gained
traction, and our modern notion of cultural literacy has grown more
inclusive and pluralistic as a result. For example, E.D. Hirsch’s 1987
bestseller, Cultural Literacy, does not simply include knowledge of
Shakespeare, Dante, Mozart, and Longfellow as required elements of
cultural literacy; Disney, The Beatles, the Marx Brothers, and King
Kong all find a place on his list as well. 86 Yet this changing
perception of cultural literary has also supported the sacralization of
a wider swath of cultural production—specifically, popular works
with significant economic value.
Copyright law continues to reify cultural stratification by
supporting the notion of sacred texts. Although such texts may now
come from The Beatles instead of Shakespeare, hierarchy remains in
place, albeit with different content. Take the example of John
Lennon, Paul McCartney, George Harrison, and Ringo Starr’s
musical compositions. Their works are consecrated and untouchable.
However, this inviolability is not driven by norms (as it may have
been in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) but, rather,
by copyright law. And just as avant-garde artists challenged norms of
inviolability in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, their
intellectual heirs today challenge the growing scope of copyright
protection.
C. Love and Law: A Modern Example
Changing copyright protections therefore served evolving
cultural norms and the sacralization project, a process that continues
to take place when rights holders and users of creative content clash.
Take, for example, the Love project, released by The Beatles in
2006. 87 A Grammy Award-winning soundtrack compilation album
and a Cirque du Soleil show playing exclusively in Las Vegas, Love
featured an innovative remixing and reinterpretation of

86. E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW
146 (1987); LEVINE, supra note 51, at 248.
87. THE BEATLES, LOVE (Apple Records 2006).
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approximately 130 different recordings by the band. 88 Yet it was not
without its critics. While giving the soundtrack an “A,”
Entertainment Weekly commented that the album “flirts with heresy
by remixing and remodeling the most sacrosanct pop canon of the
20th century” but that “[y]ou could figure it as a sop to today’s
interactive mash-up culture.” 89
In All Together Now, the documentary that follows the creation
of the Love show and soundtrack, Paul McCartney waxes eloquent
about the majestic and transformative nature of the remixes in Love
and how they allow listeners to experience The Beatles in an entirely
new manner. 90 In an ostensible nod to musical democracy, he rejects
calls of heresy, noting that audiences can always play the group’s old
albums if they want to hear the original songs in their unadulterated
form. 91 McCartney’s view of Love is entirely laudatory, as he takes
pains to convey that the project allows audiences to re-examine and
reinterpret The Beatles in a provocative and meaningful way.
Notwithstanding McCartney’s words, however, one cannot help
but question the depths of his sentiments. After all, he does not
appear ready to open the marketplace to others who might be
capable of taking The Beatles oeuvre in innovative and expressive
directions—far from it, in fact, as only two people in the world,
trusted producer George Martin and his son Giles, were given the
sole right to engage in such a remarkable reinterpretive journey with
the works of The Beatles. 92 And while the project had no direct
involvement from either of the surviving Beatles, Paul and Ringo, 93 it
did require a smidgeon of vital input: approval. Because of the
exclusive rights secured under the Copyright Act, the ability to
conduct a remix depended entirely on receiving permission from
Paul McCartney, Ringo Starr, Yoko Ono, and Olivia Harrison. 94
Moreover, if anyone besides the Martins had attempted the feat, he
or she would have faced a multimillion-dollar lawsuit for the

88. ALL TOGETHER NOW (Apple Corps Ltd./Cirque du Soleil, 2008) (documentary
about the making of the Love project).
89. Chris Willman, Peace, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (Nov. 17, 2006) (review of Love),
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,1560886,00.html.
90. ALL TOGETHER NOW, supra note 88.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (granting copyright holders the exclusive right to
authorize derivatives based on their protected work(s)).
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unauthorized creation of a derivative work.
Witness the response to the wildly popular The Grey Album,
which preceded Love by two years. A mash-up by Danger Mouse that
remixed Jay-Z’s The Black Album with numerous samples from The
White Album by The Beatles, The Grey Album was motivated by the
same creative and artistic spirit purportedly fueling Love. According
to many observers, it succeeded brilliantly. Among other things, the
work was named by Entertainment Weekly as the Top Album of
2004. 95 However, unlike Love, The Grey Album’s very existence was
illegal, 96 if not criminal. 97 Music label EMI, acting with the apparent
blessing of The Beatles, responded not with love, but rather with
law. Attorneys attempted to wipe the recording out of existence by
serving online distributors with the usual stream of cease-and-desist
letters threatening infringement litigation. 98 And although there are
pockets of the Internet where you can still download copies of The
Grey Album, you will never find it mass distributed at retail stores.
With the tools of copyright law put to use, sacred works can
remain relatively inviolable, subject only to reinterpretation when the
masters themselves deem a project worthy (artistically, monetarily, or
otherwise). In other words, the sacred work is shielded from the
open marketplace through the derivative-rights doctrine that forbids
mongrelization in all forms. 99 As Max Weber once noted,
stratification or status order comes to being when certain ideals,
material goods, or opportunities are “directly withh[e]ld from free
exchange by monopolization, which may be effected either legally or
conventionally.” 100 This observation applies with force to the stategranted monopoly that is intellectual property. Comments Levine,
95. Cory Doctorow, EW Picks Grey Album for Best of 2004, BOINGBOING.NET (Dec. 28,
2004, 11:23 PM), http://boingboing.net/2004/12/28/ew-picks-grey-album-.html.
96. As scholar Jonathan Zittrain observed,
As a matter of pure legal doctrine, the Grey Tuesday protest is breaking the law, end
of story. But copyright law was written with a particular form of industry in mind.
The flourishing of information technology gives amateurs and homerecording artists
powerful tools to build and share interesting, transformative, and socially valuable
art drawn from pieces of popular cultures. There’s no place to plug such an
important cultural sea change into the current legal regime.
MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND CONSUMER REVOLUTION 134 (2007).
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (providing for criminal penalties for certain forms
of willful copyright infringement).
98. See Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2004),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/02/62276.
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100. MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 93 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1999).
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When Shakespeare, opera, art, and music were subject to free
exchange, as they had been for much of the nineteenth century,
they became the property of many groups, the companion of a
wide spectrum of other cultural genres, and thus their power to
bestow distinction was diminished, as was their power to please
those who insisted on enjoying them in privileged circumstances,
free from the interference of other cultural groups and the dilution
of other cultural forms. 101

But when taboos emerge—whether based on the emergence of a
new set of norms or the expanding scope of copyright law—works
remain intentionally unadulterated, consecrated in a static state that
perpetuates their elite status.
The power of The Beatles and their business partners to control
the destiny (and maintain the “aura”) of their musical compositions
for a lifetime plus seventy years is, of course, a product of the
copyright system. 102 In the context of sampling sound recordings,
courts have been especially enthusiastic about protecting rights
holders against unauthorized users. In so doing, they have chosen to
deny any semblance of a fair-use defense to litigants using sound
recordings without authorization, no matter how trivial or
transformative the use. For example, the first reported decision to
consider the legality of sampling elected to resolve the issue by
quoting Exodus and sophistically equating the Seventh
Commandment with the law of copyright. 103 “Thou shalt not steal,”
the court tersely warned. 104 More recently, a federal circuit court
addressing the same question left God out of the equation but
remained equally blunt when it cautioned: “Get a license or do not
sample.” 105 In the process, the court held that any unauthorized
sample of a sound recording, no matter how small, constituted
copyright infringement, regardless of any fair-use defense. 106

101. LEVINE, supra note 51, at 230.
102. Works created after January 1, 1978 enjoy copyright protection for the lifetime of
the last surviving author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(b). Of course, however,
musical compositions by The Beatles were written before January 1, 1978. As a result, they are
protected for 95 years from their date of creation under American law. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)
(2012) (granting an additional 67 year term to works in their first term (of 28 years of
protection) as of January 1, 1978).
103. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
104. Id. (quoting Exodus 20:15).
105. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 398–99.
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Thus, if you try to pull a stunt like Love, no matter how much it
may constitute a labor of love, the potential consequences could be
severe. First, under existing law, you will almost certainly be liable
for infringement. 107 Second, the penalties could be devastating. The
Beatles works are, quite naturally, timely registered and eligible for
enhanced remedies in the event of infringement: statutory damages
of up to $150,000 per act of willful infringement 108 (of which there
would be at least 130 if one replicates the Love project) and recovery
of reasonable attorneys’ fees. 109 Consequently, even without causing
any cognizable actual damage or making any actual profits from the
unauthorized exploitation of The Beatles works, an individual trying
to make her own version of Love could face damages in excess of $20
million—$19,500,000 110 plus fees and costs. Progress, even in the
arts, has a price; but it needn’t be that high.
The Beatles, of course, are not alone in dangling copyright’s
Sword of Damocles over the heads of would-be appropriationists
creating derivative works. Almost any book, periodical, recording,
movie, television show, or computer program put out by a large
press, magazine publisher, music label, film studio, broadcast
network, or software developer enjoys similar protection, even
though many such works may lack continued economic value. 111

107. See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (“In a case where the copyright owner sustains the
burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in
its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$150,000.”).
109. Id. § 505 (providing that a court may “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party” in an infringement suit).
110. $150,000 per act of infringement multiplied by 130 acts of infringement. See id. §
504 (enabling copyright holders to seek recovery of statutory damages in the amount of up to
$150,000 per willful act of infringement of a copyrighted work).
111. Courts possess wide, if not entirely unfettered, discretion in deciding where in the
statute’s range a statutory damages award should fall and they need only be guided by their
sense of justice. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232
(1952) (citing L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 106–07 (1919))
(noting that, for awarding statutory damages, “the court’s discretion and sense of justice are
controlling”). Indeed, some circuits have suggested there need not be any relationship to
actual harm in the assessment of statutory damages. See Capital Records, Inc. v. ThomasRasset, Nos. 11–2820, 11–2858, 2012 WL 3930988, at *7 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012) (“It
makes no sense to consider the disparity between ‘actual harm’ and an award of statutory
damages when statutory damages are designed precisely for instances where actual harm is
difficult or impossible to calculate.”).
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IV. THE ASSERTION OF RIGHTS

It is not just in the vesting of rights where copyright’s regulatory
regime exerts its broader social influence. Indeed, the process of
rights assertion—which includes how and when rights are asserted
and against whom they are enforceable—both reflects and impacts
dominant discourses, social relationships, and struggles over cultural
and political meaning.
A. Guantanamo’s Greatest Hits: Music, Torture, and Copyright Law
Consider the curious case of the use of music by the federal
government at the American military base at Guantanamo Bay and
the subsequent response by the recording industry, especially in light
of its aggressive long-term campaign against unauthorized file
sharing on the Internet. Shortly after taking office in 2009, President
Barack Obama stated that he would bring to an end the use of
Guantanamo Bay as a detention camp for enemy combatants in the
war on terrorism. 112 With the eventual close of the facility, a number
of rather controversial policies would presumably come to an end. Of
those policies, one of the more unusual was the military’s arguably
infringing use of music on the prisoners. 113 The soundtrack to
Guantanamo Bay, it turns out, was replete with copyrighted songs
meant to addle and unnerve, especially on repeat, but to which the
government apparently possessed no rights to perform. 114
As a preliminary matter, the playlist at Guantanamo was filled
with interesting choices. For example, it included “Fuck Your

112. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec’y of Def. and the Att’y
Gen. (Dec. 15, 2009) (Presidential Memorandum – Closure of Detention Facilities at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/presidential-memorandum-closure-dentention-facilities-guantanamo-bay-naval-base; see
also Ed Henry, Obama to Order Guantanamo Bay Prison Closed, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/12/obama.gitmo/.
113. See David Alexander, Performers Angry Their Music Used in Guantanamo
Interrogations, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/frontrow/2009/10/22/
performers-angry-their-music-used-in-guantanamo-interrogations/.
114. Cahal Milmo, Pop Stars Demand Details of Guantanamo Music ‘Torture’,
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/popstars-demand-details-of-guantanamo-music-torture-1807255.html (“Campaigners say there is
evidence that music played repeatedly at ear-splitting levels was used to ‘humiliate, terrify,
punish, disorient and deprive detainees of sleep’ as part of efforts to break detainees during
interrogation. Former inmates at Guantanamo have previously testified that songs from
AC/DC, Britney Spears, the Bee Gees and Sesame Street were played as part of a psychological
onslaught.”).
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God” 115—a particularly bizarre selection considering the Bush
Administration’s religiosity and the federal government’s position,
through the Federal Communications Commission, on the use of
indecent language in other contexts. 116 Guantanamo Bay’s Top Ten
List—the songs most frequently played to interrogate prisoners—
featured a perverse smorgasbord of heavy metal, noxious children’s
music, and (seemingly) patriotic stadium rock:
1. “Enter Sandman” – Metallica
2. “Bodies” – Drowning Pool
3. “Shoot to Thrill” – AC/DC
4. “Hell’s Bells” – AC/DC
5. “I Love You” (from the Barney and Friends children’s television
show)
6. “Born In The USA” – Bruce Springsteen
7. “We Are The Champions” – Queen
8. “Babylon” – David Gray
9. “White America” – Eminem
10. “Sesame Street” (theme from eponymous children’s television
show) 117

Thankfully, the Cure’s “Killing an Arab” (no matter what its
existentialist, Camusian roots) was not on the list.
The music policy is, of course, not entirely new. In 1989,
General Manuel Noriega, a reputed opera lover, 118 was holed up in a
Papal nunciature in Panama City, seeking refuge with the Vatican
after American forces had invaded his country. In response,
American military officials bombarded him incessantly with loud rock
and pop, including such songs as “Nowhere to Run” and
“Smugglers Blues.” 119 In 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) and the FBI famously blared

115. Andy Worthington, A History of Music Torture in the “War on Terror”,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2008, 12:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andyworthington/a-history-of-music-tortur_b_151109.html.
116. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 2308909, at *17 (arguing that
the FCC has broad authority to enforce the statutory prohibition on the broadcast of “any
obscene, indecent or profane” language over the public airwaves).
117. Martyn McLaughlin, Rock Legends Want to Silence Guantanamo’s Torture Tunes,
SCOTSMAN (Dec. 10, 2008, 9:05 PM), http://news.scotsman.com/topstories/Rock-legendswant—to.4782083.jp.
118. George J. Church et al., Panama No Place to Run, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990. at 38.
119. Roberto Suro, Vatican Is Blaming U.S. for Impasse on Noriega’s Fate, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1989, at 1.
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heavily distorted music and recordings of rabbits being slaughtered
during the infamous stand-off with the Branch Davidians in Waco,
Texas. 120 The origins may go even further back than 1989 in Panama
City. One military official, retired United States Air Force Lieutenant
Colonel Dan Kuehl, located the policy’s spiritual genesis in the
Bible: “Joshua’s army used horns to strike fear into the hearts of the
people of Jericho. . . . His men might not have been able to break
down literal walls with their trumpets, but the noise eroded the
enemy’s courage,” he commented. 121
Politics aside and whatever its origins, the government’s music
policy in Guantanamo raised a key copyright issue: It appeared that
the government was not paying the appropriate public performance
licenses needed to play the music. 122 But, the response from artists
concerning government use of copyrighted material overseas and
without permission is mixed. For example, James Hetfield of
Metallica appears to condone the military’s public performance use
of his work in Fallujah: “If the Iraqis aren’t used to freedom, then
I’m glad to be part of their exposure.” 123 Hetfield did mention,
however, that the government had neither asked his permission nor
paid him royalties. 124 Ironically, in other contexts, Metallica has
claimed that the unauthorized use of a copyright holder’s works
constitutes an inexcusable act of thievery. 125 For example, the band
has led the fight against unauthorized downloading of its music on
the Internet. 126
Not all artists were so enthusiastic about the military’s
unauthorized use of their music, however. As Trent Reznor of Nine
Inch Nails wrote, “It’s difficult for me to imagine anything more
profoundly insulting, demeaning and enraging than discovering

120. Michael Isikoff & Pierre Thomas Reno, FBI Took Fatal Gamble; Officials Believed
Suicides Unlikely, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1993, at A1.
121. Clive Stafford Smith, Welcome to “the Disco,” GUARDIAN, (June 19, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/19/usa.guantanamo.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (granting copyright holders to musical compositions the
exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly” with “perform” being defined as
“not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or
showing is transmitted or communicated to the public”).
123. Lane DeGregory, Iraq ‘n’ Roll, TAMPA BAY TIMES, (Nov. 21, 2004),
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/21/Floridian/Iraq__n__roll.shtml.
124. Id.
125. Metallica v. Napster, No. C 00-4068 MHP, 2001 WL 777005 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2001) aff’d sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
126. Id.
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music you’ve put your heart and soul into creating has been used for
purposes of torture.” 127 Reznor also threatened legal action: “If
there are any legal options that can be realistically taken they will be
aggressively pursued, with any potential monetary gains donated to
human rights charities.” 128 However, it appears that Reznor never
followed up on this threat. In contraposition to Metallica, Reznor
has served as a powerful voice opposing the Recording Industry
Association of America (“RIAA”) lawsuits against unauthorized
Internet downloading. 129
While a few individual artists have raised concerns about the
apparent infringement, the industry itself has remained relatively
silent. Although the RIAA appears to have no qualms about suing
children and grandmothers for engaging in peer-to-peer file
sharing, 130 it does not seem as enthusiastic about pursuing
infringement charges against the federal government, despite the
brazen unauthorized public performance of the songs. 131
Admittedly, the infringement issue at Guantanamo does raise
some complexities. The most immediate question that comes to
mind is whether and how U.S. copyright law might apply in
Guantanamo in the first place. After all, it is an axiomatic principal of
American copyright law that it has no extraterritorial application. 132
And, as the Bush Administration maintained in constitutional
challenges to its Guantanamo detention policy, the territory was not
considered United States soil in any sense of the word. 133 Specifically,
the government claimed that it did not exert sovereignty over
Guantanamo Bay, and, therefore, United States law did not apply
there. 134 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected this
127. Nine Inch Nails Official Website, Regarding NIN Music Used at Guantanamo Bay
for
Torture,
Forums
(last
visited
Dec.
11,
2008),
http://forum.nin.com/bb/read.php?9,302470.
128. Id.
129. Greg Sandoval, Take My Music, Please, CNET NEWS (Oct. 30, 2007, 4:12 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9807934-7.html.
130. See Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good Targets
for the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 146
(2006) (documenting the music industry’s peer-to-peer litigation campaign).
131. See Smith, supra note 121.
132. Phanesh Koneru, The Right “To Authorize” in U.S. Copyright Law: Questions of
Contributory Infringement and Extraterritoriality, 37 IDEA 87, 89 (1996) (“The Copyright
Act is presumed to have no extraterritorial application, which means that infringement
occurring outside the United States is not actionable under the Act.”).
133. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008).
134. Id. at 765 (“[T]he Government’s view is that the Constitution ha[s] no effect there,
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argument in Boumediene v. Bush, finding that the United States had
exerted de facto sovereignty through its “complete and
uninterrupted” exercise of “absolute and indefinite” control over
Guantanamo for almost a century. 135
Arguably, the federal Copyright Act applies in any territory over
which the United States exerts sovereignty. 136 However, to avoid any
issue of ambiguity, most United States territories have an express
statute that enables application of federal copyright laws. 137 For
example, the Copyright Act applies in the Panama Canal Zone
through operation of section 391 of the Panama Canal Code, which
provides that “[t]he patent, trade-mark, and copyright laws of the
United States shall have the same force and effect in the Canal Zone
as in continental United States, and the district court is given the
same jurisdiction in actions arising under such laws as is exercised by
United States district courts.” 138 Guantanamo Bay does not appear
to have such a provision in place. Thus, post-Boumediene, there is
still some question about the application of American copyright
protection in Guantanamo.
However, one can potentially circumvent this problem in two
ways. First, if a part of the infringing activity occurs in the United
States (e.g., perhaps the recordings are selected in the United States
for unauthorized public performance in Guantanamo Bay), parties in
the United States who contributed to the infringing activity can be
held liable under American copyright law. 139 Second, if one

at least as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed sovereignty in the formal sense
of the term” in its 1903 lease with Cuba.).
135. Id. at 727.
136. See, e.g., Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.
1996) (“United States copyright law applies to what takes place in the United States, [though]
not to what takes place in Italy, Germany, or any other foreign places”).
137. See Borge Varmer, Study No. 34 Copyright in Territories and Possessions of the United
States, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Comm. Print 1961) (noting how the U.S. Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico, among other territories, have such enabling acts).
138. C.Z. CODE tit. 3, § 391 (1934).
139. As Nimmer writes, “[I]f, and to the extent, a part of an ‘act’ of infringement occurs
within the United States, then, although such act is completed in a foreign jurisdiction, those
parties who contributed to the act within the United States may be rendered liable under
American copyright law.” MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4-17 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (citing, inter alia, Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24
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distinguishes Boumediene and argues that the terms of the lease for
Guantanamo between Cuba and the United States determine the
issue, Cuba is the territorial sovereign and unauthorized performance
would represent a violation of Cuban law. 140 Given these facts, it is
surprising that not a single one of the myriad “rockers” with a
penchant for all things Che Guevara has reveled at the prospect of
suing the United States government for infringement under Cuban
copyright law.
The lack of action by composers and record labels has effectively
granted the federal government unfettered rights to take the works
of various recording artists and cast them in unfamiliar lights and
contexts, thereby lending some of these compositions’ meanings
entirely at odds with the intentions of their authors. Consider Bruce
Springsteen’s “Born in the U.S.A.” 141 Through its bleak portrait of a
Vietnam veteran forgotten by his own country, the song presents a
poignant critique of societal inequities and our tragic failure to
properly honor our most courageous individuals for their
sacrifices. 142 Played at Guantanamo Bay, however, the song takes on
an entirely different significance—at least to its intended audience of
soldiers and detainees. 143 With the imprimatur of DJ Uncle Sam, the
song’s seemingly jingoistic, anthemic chorus takes center stage. In
the process, the tune transforms into a patriotic paean rather than a
biting attack on the false promises of the American dream and it
serves as an effective aural device to demarcate the insider-outsider
(or American/non-terrorist versus non-American/terrorist) divide
separating the soldiers and detainees. Indeed, a central distinction
between detainees taken to Guantanamo Bay and held indefinitely
without charges and those brought to the United States and entitled
to full due process rights was initially based on a detainee’s

F.3d 1088, 1094 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
140. Cuban Copyright Law art. 4 (Act No. 14/1977), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=174839.
141. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the U.S.A., on BORN IN THE U.S.A. (Colombia
Records 1984).
142. Id. (Columbia Records 1984) (“Come back home to the refinery/Hiring man says
‘son if it was up to me’/Went down to see my V.A. man/He said ‘son don’t you understand
now’. . . Down in the shadow of penitentiary/Out by the gas fires of the refinery/I’m ten
years burning down the road/Nowhere to run ain’t got nowhere to go/Born in the U.S.A./I
was born in the U.S.A./Born in the U.S.A./I’m a long gone daddy in the U.S.A.”).
143. Considering that some of the detainees may not speak English, one could argue that
the message targets the soldiers as much as the detainees.
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citizenship/birth status. 144 If you were, indeed, lucky enough to be
born in the U.S.A., you were entitled to fundamentally different
rights than those who were not. 145 Thus, besides setting a patriotic
tone and asserting the base’s status as a distinctly American space,
the blaring of the song over the Guantanamo loudspeakers also
serves as a stark reminder to the detainees of how much the accidents
of birth can affect one’s fate.
All told, the unauthorized use of Springsteen’s “Born in the
U.S.A.” allows the government to re-engineer the meaning of the
song almost entirely, transforming it from an ironic and caustic
critique of our societal failures to a bold assertion of national pride
and prowess. And it is the absence of infringement litigation that
enables this radical semiotic recasting of the work to take place.
Indeed, at a time when the recording industry is suing individual
users for millions of dollars for unauthorized peer-to-peer
downloading—an effort supported by the federal government with
legislation that has provided heightened statutory damages and
increased criminal enforcement of copyright laws146—the recording
industry has remained quiet about the federal government’s use of
copyrighted recordings at Guantanamo Bay. And the federal
government has shown no compunction about making such uses,
regardless of the potential infringement. 147
B. The RIAA’s Litigation Campaign Against Online File Sharing
The lack of enforcement against the federal government’s
activities in Guantanamo stands in sharp contrast to the recording
industry’s massive campaign against ordinary individuals who have

144. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding, inter alia, that
detainees who are American citizens are entitled to challenge their detention before an
impartial judge).
145. See, e.g., id.
146. See, e.g., Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of
1999, Pub. L. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (providing for a sharp increase in the range for
statutory damages awards under the Copyright Act); Examining U.S. Governmental
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 10-11 (2007) (statement of Kevin J. O’Connor, Chairman of the Department of
Justice Task Force on Intellectual Property) (noting the federal government’s increasing
commitment to enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act).
147. The United States government has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to
copyright infringement claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (giving copyright holders the right to
bring claims against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims for acts of
copyright infringement).
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engaged in online file sharing. Individuals unlucky enough to come
under the gaze of the content-creation industries have faced
devastating monetary penalties and even jail time for their actions. 148
Doctoral candidate Joel Tenenbaum was famously on the receiving
end of a bankrupting judgment in the amount of $645,000 in
statutory damages for making thirty songs available for downloading
on a peer-to-peer network. 149 Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a single
mother of four who earned her living working as a natural-resources
coordinator for a Native American tribe in Minnesota, suffered a
$1.92 million judgment after being found liable for making twentyfour songs available for online file sharing. 150
Although such judgments seem staggering, Tenenbaum and
Thomas-Rasset enjoyed relatively lenient treatment when compared
to some others. Jack Yates, a twenty-eight-year-old who worked for a
duplication company charged with making promotional copies of the
Michael Myers movie The Love Guru, made the mistake of burning
an unauthorized copy of the movie. 151 This copy eventually made its
way onto the Internet, where it was allegedly downloaded more than
85,000 times. 152 For his actions, the government charged Yates with
criminal copyright infringement and sentenced him to six months in
a federal prison. 153 Kevin Cogill, a blogger who posted nine tracks
from Guns N’ Roses’s long-awaited album, Chinese Democracy, on

148. For timely-registered works, infringers face statutory damages in the amount of up
to $150,000 per willful act. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“In a case where the copyright owner
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully,
the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more
than $150,000.”). In the digital age, these numbers can add up quickly. The Copyright Act
also provides for criminal penalties, including up to five years imprisonment, for certain types
of first offenses. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
149. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011).
150. See Chandra Steele, 8 Ways Tech Could Throw You in Jail, Or Worse, PCMAG.COM
(Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/slideshow/story/294889/8-ways-tech-couldthrow-you-in-jail-or-worse/5; Chris Williams, Big Fine Could Be Big Trouble in Downloading
Case, PHYSORG.COM (June 19, 2009), http://www.physorg.com/news164653697.html
(noting that Tom Sydnor, the director of the Progress & Freedom Foundation’s Center for
the Study of Digital Property, defended the verdict by arguing that “[l]egally acquiring a
license to give copies of a song to potentially millions of Kazaa users might well have cost
$80,000 per song” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151. See Richard Lawson, How The Love Guru Could Cost You Half a Year of Your Life,
GAWKER (June 19, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://gawker.com/5296843/how-the-love-gurucould-cost-you-half-a-year-of-your-life.
152. See ‘Love Guru’ Costs Dumbass 6 Months of Freedom, TMZ (June 19, 2009, 9:15
AM), http://www.tmz.com/2009/06/19/love-guru-costs-dumbass-6-months-of-freedom.
153. Id.
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his website shortly before the songs’ release in 2008, saw police
arrest him at gunpoint, for violating federal copyright law. 154 Facing
a potential five-year prison term and a $250,000 fine under federal
law, he pled guilty to the charges and prosecutors sought a sixmonth sentence. 155
So, while individuals have suffered back-breaking litigation for
acts of online file sharing, the federal government has been fortunate
enough to avoid enforcement for its unauthorized uses of music at
Guantanamo. Meanwhile, state governments enjoy absolute
immunity for copyright infringement. 156 Indeed, despite attempts by
Congress to dictate otherwise, states can make unauthorized use and
abuse of copyrighted works with impunity and suffer no adverse legal
consequences. 157
In short, the very acts from which the federal government has
evaded enforcement and state governments continue to possess
sovereign immunity can, and have, resulted in the economic
destruction of individual lives. At the very least, the vast disparity in
treatment for similar acts raises fundamental questions of equity.
More pointedly, it reveals a broader and more systematic structuring
of copyright law to support entrenched social, political, and
economic interests, either at the expense of or in contraposition to
treatment of the unsophisticated or less powerful.
To be sure, patterns of enforcement have much to do with
strategic considerations in achieving long-term profit maximization.
For example, a movie studio may turn a blind eye to unauthorized
fan fiction since suing one’s consumers can create bad press and
developing an active fan fiction pool might ultimately inure to the
benefit of the studio by generating increased interest in its franchise.
But these decisions do not just have consequences for the potential
litigants involved. In the aggregate, choices about the prosecution of
intellectual-property rights may also have a broader impact on
society. Take the enforcement decisions of the United States
Olympic Committee (“USOC”) with respect to their most valuable
piece of intellectual property—the term “Olympic.” While the
USOC has no problem with an international, quadrennial

154. See David Kravets, Feds Demand Prison for Guns N’ Roses Uploader, WIRED (Mar.
13, 2009, 4:37 PM), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/03/feds-demand-6-m.html.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 43.
157. Id.
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competition for athletes with disabilities (i.e., the Special Olympics)
using the “Olympic” mark, it fought tooth and nail, and even won a
Supreme Court victory, to prevent such a use by an international,
quadrennial competition for athletes who are gay. 158 This
enforcement position does not simply impact the USOC, the Special
Olympics and the Gay Games. Instead, it sends a powerful message
about athletic competition and sexual orientation and effectively
patrols which social groups enjoy semiotic access to our cultural
heritage and which ones do not. 159
To explore these themes further, scholarship in other fields can
provide inspiration and guidance. For example, First Amendment
scholars have analyzed how the inherent subjectivity of obscenity law
and its selective enforcement can lead to viewpoint discrimination
and the silencing of subversive voices coming from marginalized
groups. 160 Criminal law theorists have analyzed the serious class and
race implications of mass incarceration, the war on drugs, and the
enforcement of narcotics law. 161 Similarly, by examining patterns of

158. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547–48
(1987) (affirming the right of the USOC to prevent the use of the term “Olympic” by an
international, quadrennial competition for gay athletes); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, &
Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2011) (describing the enforcement efforts of the USOC).
159. John Tehranian, supra note 158, at 51. (“But, when intellectual property laws begin
to control the use of our language[,] . . . we risk creating a class of linguistic haves and havenots. . . . To see and consume the word ‘Olympic’ in association with a gay event helps
attenuate residual prejudices about sport and sexual preference. It can imbue individuals with
the sense that one’s sexual orientation is immaterial to one’s ability to attain athletic excellence,
thereby impacting identity formation. At the same time, the ability to use the word ‘Olympics’
in association with a gay event sends a powerful expressive message about a particular
community’s relationship with a broader international tradition. By restricting the use of
linguistic tools such as basic words imbued with cultural meaning, we ultimately limit selfdefinition and expression, the very hallmarks of personhood development. Intellectual-property
laws therefore patrol insider-outsider boundaries within mainstream society, and perpetuate
social hierarchy by artificially limiting the use of language by non-preferred groups.”).
160. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of
Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1565 (1988) (“[T]he suppression of
pornography [enables] the state [to] certify and enforce a moral code that reinforces and
justifies the political status quo.”); John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller,
and the Future of Public Discourse on the Internet, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 16–21 (2003)
(arguing that, in practice, obscenity law has served “as a means to suppress ideas and prevent
challenges to the dominant social and racial paradigm. . . . It is hardly a coincidence that ethnic
and sexual minorities have been the most prominent targets of obscenity law enforcement in
the United States over the past several years.”).
161. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4 (2010) (arguing that the mass incarceration facilitated by
our criminal justice system, including its drug laws, constitutes “a stunningly comprehensive
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rights assertion in the aggregate, intellectual-property scholars can
analyze the ways in which the regulation of cultural production and
reproduction might cut along and against racial, gender, sexual
orientation, class, and other social fault lines.
V. THE ADJUDICATION OF RIGHTS: THE MODERN HIERARCHIES
OF PROTECTION
Finally, besides exerting its influence through the creation and
assertion of rights, copyright law shapes societal structures and
regulates individual behavior as part of a larger hegemonic project
during the process of adjudicating rights. Privileging certain forms of
cultural content creates a hierarchy of protection with broad social
import. The hierarchies of protection effectively afforded in the
adjudication of federal copyright law are constructed, inter alia,
through seemingly innocuous procedures—such as the registration
requirement 162—and the ostensibly aesthetically neutral application
of substantive rules—such as the fair-use doctrine or the idea–
expression dichotomy. The registration requirement can profoundly
determine the rights given to a work. Meanwhile, the rhetoric of
aesthetic neutrality is belied by aesthetic judgments that are imbued
with cultural and political biases that inevitably determine the level of
protection granted to copyright works. Thus, while the use (or lack
thereof) of intellectual property can have a profound impact on
personhood interests, access to intellectual property represents a tool
for both the maintenance and perpetuation of hierarchy. Control of
personhood is achieved through the control of intellectual property,
as intellectual property becomes a key and instrumental force in any
hegemonic identity project.
First, consider how creative works are given differing levels of
protection based on the formalities of our registration regime, which
by its nature creates two classes of works: those by sophisticated

and well-disguised system of racialized social control”); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of
Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 22 (2012) (noting that
“[w]hile scholars have long analyzed the connection between race and America’s criminal
justice system, an emerging group of scholars and advocates has highlighted the issue with a
provocative claim: They argue that our growing penal system, with its black tinge, constitutes
nothing less than a new form of Jim Crow”); Roseanne Scotti & Steven Kronenberg,
Foreword, Symposium: U.S. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 303, 303 (2001) (noting the emerging literature examining the “disparate impact and
enforcement of [drug] laws and policies on minority communities”).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2012).

1267

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

creators and those by unsophisticated creators. Works by
sophisticated creators, which are timely-registered, are virtually
inviolable. Their sacralization is ensured through a combination of
potentially draconian penalties, including sizable statutory
damages, 163 the awarding of attorneys’ fees, 164 and even criminal
sanctions 165—as the examples above recount. But, contrary to
conventional wisdom, works by unsophisticated creators, which are
usually not timely registered, enjoy little protection and infringed
creators are left with little practical means to vindicate their rights
through litigation. 166 As it turns out, because their works can often
be used without authorization and with impunity with few adverse
consequences, unsophisticated creators in the United States are
surprisingly far worse off than equivalent creators in many countries
in the world.
Second, besides the formalities of registration, hierarchies of
protection are effectuated through judicial decision-making.
Specifically, in applying copyright doctrine, courts regularly make
decisions based on implicit, and even explicit, aesthetic judgments—
judgments that are inevitably imbued with cultural and political
biases, thereby impacting user rights and personhood interests and
maintaining and perpetuating social order and existing hierarchies.
A. Highbrow/Lowbrow Redux: Copyright Registration and the
Sacrilization of Cultural Production
Despite our rhetoric of strong authorial protection, the
formalities of our copyright regime and enforcement reveal a more
complex system at operation. Not every author or copyright holder
enjoys extensive protection. Just as late nineteenth century America
witnessed the emergence of cultural hierarchy with the development
of the highbrow/lowbrow divide and concomitant norms to ensure
preservation of the distinction, 167 late twentieth century America has
witnessed the emergence of cultural hierarchy from the development
of two types of works—the privileged and the poorly protected. The
social loci of these two types of works are mediated by copyright law
and its technicalities. In short, the rise of mass consumer culture has
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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diminished the importance of the highbrow/lowbrow norms that
governed the sanctity of work in the late nineteenth century.
However, the stratification of cultural property continues. The divide
between high and low culture—a hierarchy of creative works—has
re-emerged. But, instead of being driven by norms, it is now
patrolled by law. Specifically, in the late twentieth century and
beyond, levels of protection are governed by the status of creators
and a single, unique feature of American copyright law: the timely
registration requirement. 168
Under the reigning 1976 Copyright Act, recovery of statutory
damages and attorneys’ fees are only available to a certain class of
copyright holders: those who register their works with the United
States Copyright Office in a timely manner in relation to the
infringement. 169 As 17 U.S.C. § 412 provides,
no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be
made for . . . any infringement of copyright commenced after first
publication of the work and before the effective date of its
registration, unless such registration is made within three months
after the first publication of the work. 170

Registration, especially timely registration, therefore represents a
pivotal feature on the copyright landscape. Without it, a plaintiff’s
remedies are limited to nothing more than actual damages—a
potential recovery that typically renders infringement litigation
quixotic. 171
Thus, with the use of formalities, the 1976 Copyright Act has
168. 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (2012).
169. This makes the United States different than any other major country. Elsewhere, full
legal vindication of one’s exclusive rights does not require the added procedure of registration,
let alone timely registration. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2012) (“[U]nlike the United States copyright
law, under virtually all foreign copyright laws there are no administrative formalities that must
be satisfied in order to create or to perfect a copyright.”).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012).
171. Without statutory damages or attorneys’ fees, recovery is limited to lost sales or
disgorgement of the infringer’s profits. Not surprisingly, the amount of these damages is often
riddled with ambiguity. Moreover, unless the infringed work is world-renowned, the damages
claim will rarely amount to more than a few thousand dollars. But pursuing an infringement
suit will cost a plaintiff several hundred thousand dollars in attorneys’ fees. And although the
plaintiff might receive an injunction to prevent further infringement, it will be costly to obtain,
especially given that the significant fees the plaintiff would have to incur are not recoupable.
Thus, even under the most optimistic scenario, legal action will infrequently be worth
pursuing, unless a plaintiff has a desire to fight for principal at his or her own peril. For a more
detailed discussion, see Tehranian, supra note 77, at 1416–21.
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actually created two distinct tiers of effective protection for
copyrighted works. Sophisticated, regular creators (generally
corporations in the content-creation industries) timely register their
works. They therefore enjoy generous remedies against infringers,
including the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and the
assessment of statutory damages—which can rise to the draconian
rate of up to $150,000 per willful act of infringement. 172 Absent any
proof of actual damages, such plaintiffs can elect statutory damages
that quickly create the possibility of a multimillion-dollar judgment
in their favor. 173 By sharp contrast, unsophisticated creators
(generally individual creators and artists) rarely timely register their
works. As a result, they are often left with little except moral force to
enforce their intellectual-property rights. By operation of copyright
law’s technicalities, they are denied the ability to recover attorneys’
fees or statutory damages, 174 even if the defendants’ infringing
conduct continues after registration. 175 They can collect only actual
damages, which are both difficult to prove and often of limited
value. 176 In short, they are left without adequate mechanisms to
vindicate the exclusive rights purportedly granted through the
Copyright Act. The dichotomy between sophisticated and
unsophisticated creators has replaced the highbrow/lowbrow divide
in patrolling the sanctity of copyrighted works.
Of course, the idea that access to legal counsel and adherence to
certain legal formalities can improve the effective scope of one’s
172. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
173. See supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012).
175. Under Section 412 of the Copyright Act, statutory damages and attorneys’ fees are
not generally available if the registration occurs after the infringement. Further, for the
purposes of determining the availability of statutory damages and fees, courts have almost
uniformly determined that the date of infringement is the date of the first infringement by the
defendant. See Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]nfringement
‘commences’ for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts constituting
continuing infringement occurs.”); accord Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528
F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the first act of infringement in a series of
ongoing infringements of the same kind marks the commencement of one continuing
infringement under [§] 412”); Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Dep’t Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 330
(4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2054 (2008); Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 483 F.3d
150, 158 (2d Cir. 2007); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 142–44 (5th Cir.
1992). As one disgruntled copyright claimant put it, this judicial interpretation grants
infringers a veritable “license to steal.” Teevee Toons, Inc. v. Overture Records, 501 F. Supp.
2d 964, 966 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
176. See supra note 171.
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rights is certainly not novel or surprising. But, the consequences in
copyright law are particularly dramatic, virtually determining the
rights to and in cultural production. Sophisticated, economically
powerful interests receive full protection for their creative works,
essentially making their cultural production sacred and inviolable.
The act of cultural reproduction that Bourdieu found so essential to
the hegemonic project 177 is, therefore, controlled and patrolled by
copyright law—with the hallowed works of elites subject to use and
re-use only with proper authorization and payment. Meanwhile, the
output of the rest of society does not receive such beatification. For
unsophisticated players, their production becomes fodder for remix,
reinterpretation, and re-commercialization, all without authorization
or payment. Thus, while the law purports to grant copyright
protection to any work of authorship with minimal creativity fixed in
a tangible medium, whether made by Manet or the Man on the
Street, that is not the case. All works and creators are not treated
alike, and the formalities of the registration requirement establish a
hierarchy of more protected and less protected works, the
untouchable and the readily malleable. The resulting gestalt enables
dominant social forces to usurp freely (both metaphorically and
literally) the creative content of the masses for their own use while
simultaneously enjoying the ability to prevent any unauthorized use
of their privileged creative content. Within the confines of this
regime, it is the underclass that typically ends up with minimal
protection: an obscure blues musician whose riffs and melodies are
appropriated by a major music label’s next big thing; a graffiti artist
from the urban corridors whose renderings eventually make their
way into the works of the modern art world’s latest sensation; an
unheralded rural landscape painter whose evocative depictions of
nature are used without authorization or payment by a major retailer
to set the mood for their western-themed sales catalog; and a
struggling dance choreographer, whose uniquely sequenced moves
land in the new music video for a leading pop star. In the absence of
timely registration, none of these individuals qualify for the recovery
of statutory damages or attorneys’ fees if they should sue and prevail
in a claim of copyright infringement. 178 Since there are also no
177. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). In fact, plaintiffs that have not timely registered their
copyrights can never receive their attorneys’ fees, even if they easily prevail in litigation. See id.
Ironically, defendants can always recover their fees in a copyright suit, a scenario that creates a
one-way risk of attorneys’ fees recovery for a plaintiff seeking to vindicate its rights without a
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punitive damages available in copyright law, would-be infringers
have little to no disincentive to make unauthorized and
uncompensated use of creative works not timely registered. 179 In the
end, therefore, these relatively ‘unsophisticated’ copyright holders
will find themselves holding what one court has aptly characterized
as “a right without a remedy.” 180
All the while, bankrupting penalties face those who would touch
the copyrighted works of the modern music industry, the major
Hollywood studios, the elite art world, or the fashion industry
without permission, even when these are built on the unprotected
works of others. Thus, the registration system plays a critical role in
perpetuating a sacrilization process that began with the development
of highbrow/lowbrow norms in the late nineteenth century and
eventually became embodied in the law through the expansion of the
copyright monopoly and the development of the derivative rights
doctrine. While the emergence of mass reproduction and digital
dissemination has threatened the consecration of privileged works,
our registration regime has rekindled the aura. What technology has
undermined, our two-tiered copyright hierarchy has reinstated, at
least in part. Consequently, by controlling the manipulation and
transformation of cultural content through its hierarchical system of
protection, copyright law’s registration requirement plays a
significant role in mediating identity formation, regulating social
networks, and controlling expressive rights as it determines the ways
in which we can and cannot interact with the seminal semiotic
signposts of our civilization.
B. Aesthetic Judgment as Hegemonic Project
1. The myth of aesthetic neutrality
Besides copyright’s procedural rules, its seemingly innocuous and
neutral substantive provisions also regulate the bodily integrity of
sacred and privileged texts, patrol cultural reproduction, and impact

timely registration. See Tehranian, supra note 77, at 1414–15.
179. As Judge Posner has noted, “there is no basis in the law for requiring the infringer
to give up more than his gain when it exceeds the copyright owners’ loss. Such a requirement
would add a punitive as distinct from a restitutionary element to copyright damages, and . . .
the statute contains no provision for punitive damages.” Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie &
Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2003).
180. See Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir.
1989) (citing 3 NIMMER § 14.02[A] at 14-14) (depicting such a circumstance).
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identity development in the service of dominant social forces. At a
rhetorical level, courts have historically maintained a steadfast
commitment to aesthetic neutrality in their copyright jurisprudence.
Consider Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s enduring and
foundational admonition enunciated in the 1903 Bleistein case. 181
Cautioning judges to expurgate aesthetic judgments from the
courtroom, Holmes, writing for the majority of a divided Supreme
Court, found no reason to deny copyright protection to an
advertisement featuring renderings of circus performers, despite its
prosaic commerciality. 182 Rejecting the view of the defendants and
the lower courts, Holmes asserted that the perceived aesthetic value
of a work could not and should not determine its copyrightability. 183
In theory, therefore, a commercial copy would receive the same
protection as high art. Reasoned Holmes in his most classic
formulation: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits.” 184
On the surface, judges have heeded Holmes’s advice, and the
rhetoric of aesthetic neutrality is a dominant trope in modern
copyright jurisprudence. Notes Robert Gorman, “It is indeed the
rare judge who purports to assess, in explicit terms, whether the art,
literature or music before it is good or bad.” 185 One need look no
further than the emphatic language of the Seventh Circuit: “[J]udges
can make fools of themselves pronouncing on aesthetic matters.” 186
Yet for all this rhetorical solicitude, courts inevitably make
aesthetic judgments when approaching copyright cases. In his
groundbreaking work on the subject, Alfred Yen argues that the
palaver of aesthetic neutrality has belied the common judicial practice
of assessing aesthetic factors in deciding fundamental issues of
copyright law. 187 To illustrate this point, Yen examines seminal
181. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
182. Id. at 251.
183. As Holmes argued, “That these pictures had their worth and their success is
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.” Id.
at 252.
184. Id. at 251.
185. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?,
25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2001).
186. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
187. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,
266–97 (1998).
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jurisprudence on issues of originality, the useful arts doctrine, and
substantial similarity. 188 At a certain level, copyright hermeneutics
necessarily implicate aesthetic considerations. For example, the
Constitution’s Copyright Clause—which appears to limit copyright
protection to the extent that it promotes “the Progress of Science
demands
such
“aesthetic
and
useful
Arts” 189—virtually
190
In addition, judges have introduced aesthetic
determinations.”
considerations into the copyright calculus by determining what types
of unauthorized uses (e.g., parody versus satire) are productive or
transformative for the purposes of the first factor of the fair-use
defense. 191 Construing conceptual severability for the purposes of
distinguishing between works of applied art, which receive copyright
protection, and works of industrial design, which do not, also
inevitably involves aesthetic judgments about what constitutes art
and what defines the proper relationship between form and function
needed to secure legal protection. All told, as Robert Gorman
comments, “it is not at all rare to find courts addressing the
question, ‘what is art?’ And it is quite common to find copyright
courts assessing—sometimes covertly, sometimes openly—whether a
work has merit, worth or social value.” 192
The consequences of such aesthetic adjudications are far
reaching. As Yen argues, they inextricably affect the type of works
we, as a society, receive from our artists. 193 After all, economically
motivated artists might “prefer creating works that meet the
aesthetic preference of judges because other works would either not
get the benefits of copyright protection or wind up being
suppressed.” 194 Even more fundamentally, however, aesthetic

188. Id.
189. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
190. Gorman, supra note 185, at 2.
191. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1559 n.137 (2004) (“Whether ‘productive’ or ‘transformative’ use guides the first
fair use factor, either inquiry threatens to trap courts and litigants into making the kinds of
aesthetic judgments that the copyright system expressly disclaims.”); Gorman, supra note 185,
at 14–16; see also Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156–58, 1163 (holding that a
politician’s unauthorized use of musical compositions during a campaign constituted “satire,”
rather than “parody,” and, therefore, did not qualify for a fair-use defense as it did not
adequately comment upon or criticize the direct content of songs).
192. Gorman, supra note 185, at 2.
193. Yen, supra note 187, at 248–49.
194. Id.
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judgments can serve to both maintain and preserve existing power
structures. The seemingly neutral laws of copyright, therefore, have
the potential to create a hierarchy of culture that serves hegemonic
interests.
Consider the way in which application of the fair-use doctrine, in
combination with other copyright principles, has violated ostensible
norms of aesthetic neutrality in deciding which works will remain
consecrated and hallowed and which works will not. With a narrow
reading of fair use, a court can protect a work from remix,
reinterpretation, and unauthorized mutilation. In short, it can
preserve a work’s aura, inviolability, and canonic status and promote
its economic value to its rights holder. With a broader reading of fair
use, a court can open the floodgates for the work’s use and abuse.
Indeed, if the time has come for a work to be metaphorically rejected
from the modern canon, there is perhaps no more defining moment
than when that work loses its strong copyright protection in court. A
careful exegesis of copyright jurisprudence reveals that aesthetic
decisions, driven by implicit cultural and political considerations, can
dramatically affect the fair-use calculus, making fair use a
determination on which cultural works are the “fairest of them all.”
To illustrate this point, it is instructive to compare the results of
two recent high-profile copyright infringement suits involving
canonical literary works, unauthorized derivatives, and claims of fair
use. The first suit involved Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, an
unauthorized follow-up to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind.
The second suit involved John David California’s 60 Years Later, an
unauthorized send-up of J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye.
2. The consecration done gone: The de-canonization of Gone with the
Wind and the battle to depict the antebellum South.
In the first suit, Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Estate of
Margaret Mitchell sued to enjoin publication of Alice Randall’s The
Wind Done Gone, on the grounds that it constituted an
unauthorized derivative work based on Gone with the Wind. 195 The
main conceit of Randall’s novel was its recasting of the Gone with the
Wind story and world from the point of view of the African
American slaves and mulattos rather than the white aristocrats. In
195. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (Suntrust I), 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D.
Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 268 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir. 2001).
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Randall’s work, Ashley Wilkes is gay, interracial sexual relationships
are discussed, and the travails of daily life for the victims of the
South’s rigid and racist social hierarchy are vividly depicted. 196
A district court initially enjoined publication of The Wind Done
Gone, accepting the Mitchell Estate’s contention that it constituted
an infringing work and rejecting Randall’s fair-use defense. 197
Specifically, the trial judge found that The Wind Done Gone was a
sequel and not a parody, and therefore not the type of transformative
use granted fair-use protection. 198 The tenor of the judge’s opinion is
particularly revealing. It begins by immediately emphasizing Gone
with the Wind’s place in the cultural canon and its commercial
significance—both noting its “widespread acclaim” and its impressive
sales in the “tens of millions.” 199 These facts are, of course, largely
irrelevant to any aesthetically neutral analysis of infringement and fair
use. But, they set the tone for the court’s opinion, which reflects a
strong deference to the work’s favored aesthetic status—its presumed
import and cultural and economic value. 200
The existing body of fair-use precedent supports the proposition
that parodic works can generally enjoy exemption from infringement
liability. 201 The key portion of the trial court’s decision therefore
comes when it characterizes The Wind Done Gone as not primarily a
parody but, rather, a sequel or some other form of unauthorized
derivative work. 202 While acknowledging that the book has
numerous parodic elements, the court somehow divines that “the
book’s overall purpose is to create a sequel to the older work and
provide Ms. Randall’s social commentary on the antebellum
South.” 203 The court’s attempt to segregate the parodic elements of
the work from the sequel-like elements is difficult to understand
when the two concepts are not at all mutually exclusive and, quite
often, intertwined. For example, Mel Brooks’s classic Spaceballs is, in
some senses, both an unauthorized sequel to and parody of Star
Wars. Indeed, the dialectic that casts parody in opposition to sequel

196. See generally ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001).
197. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1385–86.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1363.
200. Id.
201. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding “that
parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use”).
202. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1385.
203. Id. at 1378.
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is, at its core, an aesthetic judgment. As a parody, the work is
presumed to be transformative and, consequently, entitled to fair use
protection for its contribution to progress in the arts. 204 As a sequel,
the work is seen as nothing more than an effort to free ride on the
copyrighted work of another. In this sense, the Suntrust court ends
up conflating its analysis of commercialism with its analysis of
transformative use, later concluding that “the purpose of putting the
key characters of Gone with the Wind in new settings is to entertain
and sell books to an active and ready-made market for the next Gone
with the Wind sequel.” 205 To the court, Randall is nothing more than
a leech sucking economic value away from Mitchell’s genius. But, at
some level, all parodies can be portrayed as such. After all, they all
rely upon the original and its status as a recognized work to a certain
audience.
As it turns out, a careful parsing of the court’s decision reveals
that this conclusion stems from aesthetic judgments about the
inviolability of Gone with the Wind. As the court tautologically posits,
“If the defendant is permitted to publish The Wind Done Gone, an
unauthorized derivative work, then anyone could tell the love story
of Gone with the Wind from another point of view and/or create
sequels or prequels populated by Ms. Mitchell’s copyrighted
characters without compensation to the Mitchell Trusts.” 206 With
these words, the court presupposes that the latter result simply
cannot occur (despite the existence of the fair-use doctrine that
plainly creates no such hard-and-fast rule). Put another way, the
court assumes, and thereby ensures, that the work must remain
inviolate. As a sacred text, Gone with the Wind should be protected
from unauthorized individuals telling the story from a different point
of view.
Consecration is at the heart of the court’s concern because a
world where the sacred text has been defiled is unimaginable: “[B]y
killing two core characters from Gone with the Wind and marrying off

204. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (“From the infancy of copyright protection, some
opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts . . . .’”
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
205. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; id. at 1379 (“The court finds that The Wind
Done Gone is unquestionably a fictional work that has an overarching economic purpose. . . .
[T]he commercial purpose of The Wind Done Gone weighs strongly in favor of the plaintiff on
the first factor . . . .”).
206. Id. at 1382.
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another, The Wind Done Gone has the immediate effect of damaging
or even precluding the Mitchell Trusts’ ability to continue to tell the
love story of Scarlett and Rhett.” 207 Read literally, the court’s
admonition fails to distinguish between real life—where an
individual’s death typically precludes the possibility of resurrection—
and fiction—where no such limitations exist. The statement not only
reflects a startling failure of imagination by the court—doubtlessly
provoked by the inability to envision the bastardization of the
consecrated work—but also does not hold weight empirically. For
example, the Star Trek franchise has continued to thrive in telling
the stories of Captain Kirk, Mr. Spock, and the U.S.S. Enterprise,
despite the fact that both Kirk 208 and Spock 209 were killed at various
points during the authorized movies. Moreover, audiences can
readily discern between authorized and unauthorized sequels of a
franchise and, if they cannot, that is something that the federal
Lanham Act could help police through its prohibition of unfair
competition and false advertising.
Of course, the Scarlett and Rhett characters do not die just
because Randall says they do. But, what the court really fears is that
The Wind Done Gone will sound not the literal death knell for the
characters, but for Gone with the Wind’s untouchability. Stripped of
unadulterated idealization, the work and its characters can no longer
survive in the exact form they once possessed. Thus, it is not whether
the work is parody or sequel that truly appears to drive the court’s
decision; it is destruction of the work’s romanticism—a romanticism
that is grounded in a distinctly whitewashed vision of the antebellum
South that painfully ignores the harsh realities of life for that
society’s underclass. Thus, the court’s read on copyright law, driven
by aesthetic judgments, has an impact on the discourse about what is
perhaps the most famous and popular vision of Southern life during
the years of slavery. With the district court’s opinion, copyright law is
used to preserve a hegemonic vision of the South that has historically
prevailed in the American consciousness.
By sharp contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found that The Wind
207. Id.
208. WILLIAM SHATNER & DAVID FISHER, UP TILL NOW 287 (2008) (“Well. Kirk may
have been dead in the movies, but there was no reason he had to be dead in the publishing
industry. I sold my treatment to Simon & Schuster and Star Trek: The Return became a bestselling novel.”).
209. ROSS S. KRAEMER, WILLIAM CASSIDY & SUSAN L. SCHWARTZ, RELIGIONS OF STAR
TREK 161 (2003).
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Done Gone could enjoy fair-use and First Amendment protection and
reversed the district court’s injunction. 210 Despite its differing logic,
however, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was similarly influenced by
aesthetic judgments. 211 To the Eleventh Circuit, criticism, ridicule,
and even scorn for a work serves as a social good that trumps any
harm it may do to a copyright holder’s economic rights. 212 Citing
the Ninth Circuit’s Fisher case that immunized When Sonny Sniffs
Glue from liability as a parody of When Sunny Gets Blue, the court’s
concurring opinion by Judge Marcus asserts that “[d]estructive
parodies play an important role in social and literary criticism and
thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit
an original author.” 213 Works are not to be treated as sacred cows
and the preservation of immutability does not serve public interests.
“Because the social good is served by increasing the supply of
criticism—and thus, potentially, of truth,” posits the court, “creators
of original works cannot be given the power to block the
dissemination of critical derivative works.” 214
In particular, the Eleventh Circuit found Gone with the Wind
especially ripe for deconstruction. And this becomes a critical point
when considering identity interests and how the copyright holders
may draw on intellectual-property rights as a means to preserve and
maintain existing power structures, visions of inclusion and
exclusion, and critical historical narratives. The Eleventh Circuit
specifically singles out the Mitchell Estate’s control of prior
authorized derivative works and its desire to limit certain themes as a
basis for, rather than against, its ruling. 215 By sharp contrast to the
district court, which sought to retain the aesthetic integrity of
Mitchell’s saccharine depiction of Dixie and protect it from
unwanted mutilation, 216 the appeals court viewed Mitchell’s work as
one ripe for, if not outright in need of, deconstruction. 217 In the
210. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (Suntrust II), 268 F.3d 1257, 1276–77
(11th Cir. 2001).
211. See id. at 1271.
212. Id. at 1276–77.
213. Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
214. Id. (quoting Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
215. Id. at 1274–75 (majority opinion).
216. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386.
217. See Suntrust II, 268 F.3d at 1270, 1276–77 (stating that Randall’s work

1279

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

majority decision, the court points out that the Mitchell Estate was
particularly horrified at the idea that the Gone with the Wind milieu
might be adulterated with references to homosexuality. 218 The
concurrence goes even further, taking pains to reference the Mitchell
Estate’s particular concern with the depiction of interracial and samesex relationships. 219 Indeed, the concurring opinion quotes the
Mitchell Estate as having told a potential writer for the authorized
sequel for Gone with the Wind, “You’re not going to like this, but
the estate will require you to sign a pledge that says you will under
no circumstances write anything about miscegenation or
homosexuality.” 220 Ultimately, therefore, Randall’s right to
transform “Ashley Wilkes into a homosexual” and to “depict[] . . .
interracial sex, and . . . multiple mulatto characters” 221 strongly
informed the court’s decision to strike the injunction preventing
publication of The Wind Done Gone.
All told, the struggle over the scope of the Gone with the Wind
copyright becomes a struggle over the right to present an alternate
vision of Old Dixie, using the familiar terrain of the romanticized
antebellum South to bring long-suppressed issues of race, class, and
even sexual orientation to the forefront of the story. In the end, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the preliminary injunction enjoining
publication of The Wind Done Gone constituted “an unconstitutional
prior restraint” 222—not just of free speech broadly speaking, but of
the right to challenge the idealized notions of the Old South that
have historically resided in the national subconscious precisely
because of such works as Gone with the Wind. To the Eleventh
Circuit, the time had come to de-canonize Gone with the Wind and
end its inviolability. 223 And the decision to do so stemmed from

“explode[s] the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after the Civil
War” in Gone with the Wind, including the novel’s suggestion that “blacks and whites were
purportedly better off in the days of slavery”).
218. Id. at 1270 n.26 (noting “special relevance” in the fact that Suntrust, the trustee of
the Mitchell Trust, “makes a practice of requiring authors of its licensed derivatives to make no
references to homosexuality”).
219. Id. at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1259 (majority opinion).
223. Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (“The law grants copyright holders a powerful
monopoly in their expressive works. It should not also afford them windfall damages for the
publication of the sorts of works that they themselves would never publish, or worse, grant
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aesthetic judgments supporting the subversive power of Randall’s
broadside in novel form. 224 Painfully out of sync with more modern
views, Gone with the Wind had to face the fact that the time to lose
its consecrated status had come.
3. 60 Years Later: J.D. Salinger and the Preservation of the Canon
Indeed, a revealing contrast emerges when one considers the
ultimate outcome of The Wind Done Gone suit—which effectively
excommunicated Gone with the Wind from the category of sacred
text—to the more recent controversy involving an unauthorized
send-up of The Catcher in the Rye. Entitled 60 Years Later: Coming
Through the Rye and purportedly authored by one John David
California, 225 the fanciful reverse postmodern bildungsroman features
Holden Caulfield, now a seventy-six-year-old on the run from a
nursing home, confronting his creator, J.D. Salinger himself. 226 In
2009, J.D. Salinger came out of hiding, at least legally speaking, to
seek an injunction restraining publication of 60 Years Later on the
grounds that it constituted a blatant infringement of his copyright. 227
The defendant objected, claiming fair-use and First Amendment
protection. 228
The district court issued an injunction to enjoin the publication
and distribution of 60 Years Later after finding Salinger was likely to
prevail on the merits of the case. 229 On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed that part of the holding. 230 A central part of the decision

them a power of indirect censorship.”).
224. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is also significant in another light. What the district
court saw as property—an interest in the preservation and consecration of something over
which the Mitchell Trusts was said to possess dominion—the appeal court saw as speech. This
is an aesthetic judgment as to the nature of a copyrighted work—whether it is simply a piece of
private property, outside of the scope of the First Amendment, or whether it constitutes a form
of speech, subject to First Amendment protection.
225. John David California is the pseudonym of author Fredrik Colting. Salinger v.
Colting (Salinger I), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d
Cir. 2010).
226. See id. at 254 (granting injunction enjoining the sale of 60 Years After as an
unauthorized derivative work based on Catcher in the Rye, regardless of the originality of
contributions by the author of 60 Years After).
227. Id. at 253–54.
228. Id. at 254–55.
229. Id. at 254.
230. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II), 607 F.3d 68 (2d. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district
court’s finding that Salinger was likely to prevail on the merits of the case but remanding the
case for full consideration of the factors from eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
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came when the court distinguished the suit involving The Wind Done
Gone. 231 Specifically, the court explained that, while the Suntrust case
determined that The Wind Done Gone was a parody entitled to a
likely fair-use defense, 60 Years Later was more characteristic of a
sequel than a parody. 232 Yet The Wind Done Gone’s purported status
as a parody, sequel, or both is wrought with complexity. And, at a
minimum, it was a close call—with the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia ruling one way and the
Eleventh Circuit ruling the other. 233
Moreover, there were several key facts that actually should have
given 60 Years Later a better fair-use defense than The Wind Done
Gone. First, with respect to the fourth (and most important,
according to some courts) fair-use factor—market harm—The Wind
Done Gone was certainly more damaging to the Mitchell Estate’s
economic interests than 60 Years Later was to Salinger’s. Specifically,
the Mitchell Estate had actually demonstrated a clear interest in
entering the market to create derivative works based on Gone with
the Wind. 234 In 1991, they authorized publication of a sequel
entitled Scarlett: The Sequel to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the
Wind. 235 And, at the time of the Suntrust case, they had entered into
a contract authorizing a possible second sequel. 236 Indeed, St.
Martin’s Press had paid dearly for the privilege of publishing the
latter—to the tune of seven figures. 237 By sharp contrast, whatever
the moral offense to Salinger, the publication of 60 Years Later did
not raise the same specter of economic harm as did the publication
of The Wind Done Gone. 238 After all, Salinger was a notorious recluse
who had refused to publish anything for the past half century. 239 He
never betrayed any interest in publishing a sequel to Catcher in the
Rye. 60 Years Later is therefore highly unlikely to dilute a derivative
388 (2006) before the injunction issues).
231. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 257–58.
232. Id. at 257–58, 260 n.3.
233. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001) vacated, 252 F.3d 1165
(11th Cir. 2001) and rev’d and remanded, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
234. Id. at 1363.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1374 n.12.
238. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (noting that Salinger “has not demonstrated any
interest in publishing a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher”).
239. See PAUL ALEXANDER, SALINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 26 (2000) (explaining that
Salinger became and was famously a recluse).
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market in which Salinger had no desire whatsoever to participate.
Admittedly, the jurisprudence applying the market harm test has
suggested that harm to potential markets is enough for a plaintiff to
prevail on this element of the fair-use test. 240 The Salinger court
noted as much:
[A]lthough Salinger has not demonstrated any interest in
publishing a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher, the Second
Circuit has previously emphasized that it is the “potential market”
for the copyrighted work and its derivatives that must be examined,
even if the “author has disavowed any intention to publish them
during his lifetime,” given that an author “has the right to change
his mind” and is “entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his
[derivative works].” 241

But, potential must at least be plausible and, at the end of the
day, it is utterly disingenuous to read Salinger’s suit as an attempt to
preserve his right to change his mind should he decide to enter the
market for derivative works.
Secondly, large parts of The Wind Done Gone actually retold the
story from Gone with the Wind, 242 thereby engaging in more actual
borrowing, both literal and structural, than 60 Years Later did from
the Catcher in the Rye. The Wind Done Gone even appropriated
entire sentence structures from the original work. As an example, the
first page of The Wind Done Gone states, “She was not beautiful, but
men seldom recognized this, caught up in the cloud of commotion
and scent in which she moved,” while Gone with the Wind begins,
“Scarlett O’Hara was not beautiful, but men seldom realized it when
caught by her charm . . . .” 243 60 Years Later certainly used the
Holden Caulfield of Catcher in the Rye, but its literal borrowing was
largely limited to the use of certain (common and non-protectable)
catchphrases or idioms related to the Caulfield character. 244 In fact,
240. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–146
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the fourth factor of fair use favors the plaintiff even where it has
“evidenced little if any interest in exploiting this market for derivative works”); J.D. Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987).
241. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d. at 268 (internal citation omitted) (quoting J.D.
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)).
242. See Richard Schur, The Wind Done Gone Controversy: American Studies, Copyright
Law, and the Imaginary Domain, 44 AM. STUD. 5, 6 (2003).
243. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (quoting ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE
GONE 1 (Houghton Mifflin) (2001); MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 1
(Macmillan) (1936)).
244. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (noting 60 Years Later’s use of such Caulfield
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the Salinger ruling was notable as it represented the first time that a
court in the Second Circuit had found that copyright protection
extended to a single character who had appeared in a single novel. 245
Nevertheless, while The Wind Done Gone ultimately received a
favorable finding on fair use, 60 Years Later was enjoined from
publication. 246 And aesthetic judgments on the relative value of
unauthorized derivative works appear to have made a key difference
in court’s decision to issue the injunction. Consider the only
mention that the Salinger court makes of the overarching goals of
the copyright system. Seeking to reconcile its ruling with copyright’s
role in promoting progress in the arts, the Salinger court reasoned
that “some artists may be further incentivized to create original
works due to the availability of the right not to produce any
sequels.” 247 As a first matter, the court’s speculation on this point
strains all credulity. But regardless of how one feels about the bizarre
conjecture that the right not to produce sequels can incentivize
creation, it is clear that the court’s statement rests on a tacit aesthetic
judgment: that it is better to preserve (ex post) the incentive to
create The Catcher in the Rye than it is to stimulate the creation of
unauthorized sequels. The calculus here is fairly remarkable: the
court chooses to enjoin definitely the publication of unauthorized
derivatives—works that could contribute to progress in the arts—on
the chance, based at least in part on idle speculation, that some artists
may create more because they can rest secure in the knowledge that
no one can create sequels of their works. The hierarchy at play is
simple: the original work implicitly trumps the sequel(s) and/or
derivatives, especially those of the unauthorized variety. Certainly,
for every Godfather II and Return of the Jedi, there are dozens of
Blues Brothers 2000’s. But in deciding the fate of The Wind Done
Gone, the Eleventh Circuit certainly did not seem bothered by this
possibility, as it adopted a radically different aesthetic judgment of
the unauthorized derivative. At a more subconscious level, in the
context of our times, it perhaps feels less wrong to allow someone to

catchphrases as “‘phony,’ ‘crumby,’ ‘lousy,’ ‘hell,’ and ‘bastard’”).
245. Of course, while Holden Caulfield appeared in only one book, his character did
appear in two published short stories, see J.D. Salinger, I’m Crazy, COLLIERS MAGAZINE (Dec.
22, 1945); J.D. Salinger, Slight Rebellion Off Madison, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 21, 1946),
and his family appeared in at least one other, see J.D. Salinger, Last Day of the Last Furlough,
SATURDAY EVENING POST (July 15, 1944).
246. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
247. Id. at 268.
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skewer the dated artistic vision of Margaret Mitchell than to permit
the bastardization of the revered masterworks of The Beatles or the
adulteration of J.D. Salinger’s beloved Holden Caulfield.
In the end, the decision to open up Gone with the Wind to The
Wind Done Gone effectively freed the literary property—and, more
generally, the popular interpretation of a critical era in our nation’s
history—to different narratives and perspectives. Thus, the battle
over copyright protection can often become a clash between the
hegemonic power of cultural reproduction and subversive effects of
semiotic disobedience. 248 Through both procedural rules and
substantive doctrines, our intellectual-property laws can use
registration requirements and aesthetic judgments to achieve
something much broader than merely “progress of the arts.” Instead,
by consecrating meaning and value, patrolling cultural hierarchy, and
regulating the signposts of our society, intellectual property
transcends its small corner of the legal universe and plays a
fundamental role in shaping social structures and regulating
individual behavior as part of a broader hegemonic project.
C. Private Intellectual-Property Regimes and the Control of the Public
Domain
The ability to control meaning and interpretation of significant
cultural content is not solely a function of copyright as a public law.
As we saw earlier with our example of the emergence of the
highbrow/lowbrow dichotomy in the late nineteenth century, 249
social norms grounded in quasi-copyright can play a central role in
this process. In addition, adjudication through private ordering
regimes, existing wholly outside of (or even in circumvention of) the
federal copyright regime, can also enable the exercise of such
control.
Take the private intellectual-property regime that governs movie
titles in Hollywood. Historically, public law has provided few
protections to film titles. Titles are not registered by the Copyright
Office and courts have repeatedly refused to grant them copyright
248. Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 493–96 (2007)
(Borrowing terminology from John Fiske, Sonia Katyal refers to “semiotic disobedience” as the
act of “alter[ing] existing intellectual property by interrupting, appropriating, and then
replacing the passage of information from creator to consumer.” But, by making certain
symbols immune from remix or alteration, “propertization offers a subsidy to particular types
of expression over others”).
249. See supra, Part III.B.
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protection on the grounds that they inherently lack sufficient
originality to warrant protection. 250 Meanwhile, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and the courts have generally limited
to franchises trademark protection for titles. 251 In response,
Hollywood has established a private law regime—the Title
Registration Bureau—to fill this apparent gap. Operating relatively
unchanged since its establishment in 1925, the Bureau functions
under the auspices of the Motion Picture Association of America
(“MPAA”) (originally known as the Motion Picture Producers and
Distributors of America) and seeks to prevent unnecessary confusion
in the marketplace between similarly titled movies. 252 But the system
has a powerful secondary effect: it entitles the holders of certain titles
to privileged positions for the dissemination of their particular takes
on famous works. This is particularly troubling when those works are
in the public domain under federal copyright law and, in theory,
useable by anyone.
Although subscription to the Title Registration system is
ostensibly voluntary, all six major studios are members, as are
hundreds of independent studios. 253 In addition, any subsidiaries of
subscribing companies are also bound by the terms of the Title
Registration Agreement. 254 Under the Title Registration system,
signatories to the Agreement are allowed, among other things, to
reserve scores of titles to non-original works—even those in the
public domain—on a first-come, first-serve basis. 255 As such, various
250. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[O]verextension
of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment
values . . . .”). It should be noted, however, that post-Feist, with the minimal level of creativity
requirement blessed by the Supreme Court, one could imagine certain titles possessing
sufficient minimum creativity so as to qualify for copyright protection.
251. 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:4 (4th ed.1999).
252. TITLE REGISTRATION BUREAU, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., INC., RULES FOR
REGISTRATION OF AND DISPUTES RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATRICAL MOTION
PICTURE TITLES (2005).
253. See Frequently Asked Questions, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM.,
http://www.mpaa.org/faq (last visited, Sept. 5, 2012).
254. TITLE REGISTRATION BUREAU, supra note 252, § 2.2.2.
255. Id. at § 4.4.3.1 (“The duration of protection for titles in the Public Domain Work
Release category of the Released Film Index shall be . . . the same as a Permanent Original
Release, if a Subscriber decides to claim permanent protection . . . . During the applicable
period of protection, no identical Original Work Title or Public Domain Work Title shall be
registered.”); Id. at § 4.4.1.1. (“The duration of protection for all titles in the Permanent
Copyright Release category of the Released Index shall be permanent, unless the title is
withdrawn but subject to the registration of an identical Copyrighted Work Title or an
identical Public Domain Work Title as may be provided for in these Rules. Permanent
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studios have long-term exclusionary rights to the titles of virtually
every work in our cultural canon—even though many such works
were published prior to 1923 and no longer enjoy copyright
protection. If someone else uses a title that is even confusingly
similar to a registered public domain work during the relevant time
period, the studio that has reserved the title can challenge the use,
and the issue is decided by arbitration through the MPAA. 256 Under
the system, therefore, the particular studio that has reserved the
name “Hamlet” can ensure that it is the only major studio that can
release a feature film under that title for either a twenty-five or
twelve year window. 257 While anyone is free to make a movie version
of Shakespeare’s play Hamlet, only one studio can effectively release
a movie entitled Hamlet or, in practical terms, gain widespread
distribution of a movie entitled Hamlet for an entire generation of
viewers. Of course, another studio might be able to release their
interpretation of Hamlet under the name The Prince of Denmark,
but this version will always be at inherent disadvantage to the studio
that can actually use the real title of the (public domain) work.
Since the MPAA’s Title Registration system is a private ordering
regime, it is presumably immune from the constitutional and
doctrinal limitations on copyright law that protect the public
interest. But it impacts the public by playing a role in whose vision of
Hamlet, or any other famous work, makes it to the big screen at
theaters across the country. To do the definitive Romeo and Juliet or
20,000 Leagues Under the Sea in movie form, one must obtain
permission from, or work through, the studio that holds the right to
the title. While these works technically remain in the public domain,
they retain protection under Hollywood’s internal Title Registration
system. Thus, the exertion of control over cultural content is not
simply a function of federal copyright law, but also of private
ordering regimes that create quasi-intellectual-property rights and do
so with broader societal implications.

protection means indefinite protection rather than for the term of copyright protection under
applicable federal or state law.”) Although the system originally gave each studio the right to a
maximum of 250 reserved names, the creation of subsidiaries has rendered this limitation moot
and, in effect, each major has reserved thousands of titles.
256. Id.
257. The twenty-year window applies to original films released before September 1, 2000
and the twelve-year window applies to original films released after September 1, 2000. See Email from Mitch Schwartz, Vice President & Dir., Title Registration Bureau, Motion Picture
Ass’n of Am. (Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with editors).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Norms, public laws, and private ordering regimes that regulate
the use of intellectual property control the reproduction and
manipulation of cultural content in ways that can both serve and
subvert knowledge–power systems. A developing field of inquiry,
which this Article refers to as critical intellectual-property
scholarship, has begun to analyze this process in action. This Article
has examined the common origins of this body of literature and built
upon the extant scholarship by identifying three critical moments—
the vesting of rights, the assertion of rights and the adjudication of
rights—where the broader social consequences of intellectual
property are felt.
Focusing specifically on copyright law, we first examined how the
vesting of rights can interface with Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of
cultural reproduction. We traced the gradual ascent of Shakespeare
and opera from the realm of popular entertainment to elite culture in
the late nineteenth century. In the process, we witnessed how
changing norms and the creation of the derivative-rights doctrine
within copyright law have aided the consecration and preservation of
cultural production, a mechanism illustrated in the modern context
through a comparison of the Love project to the Grey Album.
We then turned our attention to the assertion of rights and saw
how decisions in the enforcement of copyright have broader semiotic
and social consequences. We examined the federal government’s
unauthorized use of music, such as Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the
U.S.A.,” at the American detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and
the RIAA’s high profile litigation campaign against illicit, online file
sharing. In the process, we illustrated how enforcement efforts (or
the lack thereof) can service the hegemonic recasting of cultural
meaning and how disparate assertion techniques can support
entrenched social, political, or economic interests.
Finally, we examined how the implementation of copyright’s
procedural and substantive doctrines in the adjudicative process can
maintain and perpetuate cultural hierarchy. Copyright’s seemingly
innocuous registration requirement dramatically illustrates this point
by privileging certain forms of creative production in a manner that
cuts along class lines. Meanwhile, the use of aesthetic considerations
in juridical responses to send-ups of two American classics—Gone
with the Wind and The Catcher in the Rye—demonstrates how
doctrinal interpretation can turn on implicit value judgments about
broader cultural, social, and political issues.
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All told, copyright law represents a key situs in the battle for
social control among sovereigns and their subjects, corporations and
individuals, and entrenched interest groups and young upstarts. And,
in the course of analyzing the ways in which authorial rights are
vested, asserted, and adjudicated, we have explored how the
contours of our copyright regime influence subordination practices
by manufacturing cultural hierarchy and regulating acts of semiotic
disobedience. Lying at the heart of discursive struggles over
inculcation and meaning, copyright law has dramatic consequences
for the shaping of social structures and the regulation of individual
behavior. This Article ideally represents a helpful step in the
development of a critical literature that examines the broader impact
of intellectual-property rights on social relations and knowledge–
power systems in the twenty-first century.
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